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Abstract
This article will examine the direct and indirect regulation of political speech in a chrono-
logical manner, concluding with the statutory and regulatory environment under State President
Frederik W. de Klerk, the Interim Constitution and the events leading up to the watershed April
elections. The direct regulation of political speech in post-1948 South Africa has been effected
primarily through the Suppression of Communism Act and its successor, the Internal Security Act
of 1982, the Publications and Entertainments Act and its successor, the Publications Act, a se-
ries of miscellaneous legislation imposing various substantive restrictions on private and public
speech, and finally, executive emergency regulations promulgated pursuant to the Public Safety
Act. These statutes imposed strict limitations on the dissemination of information and opinion.
They are addressed, in turn, in Section I of this article.
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INTRODUCTION
On Wednesday, December 22, 1993, an era came to a close
in South Africa. On that date, the Parliament of the Republic of
South Africa voted to approve the nation's first non-racial consti-
tution (the "Interim Constitution").' With this vote, the govern-
ment of South Africa committed itself to multi-racial elections,2
bringing an end to forty-five years of white rule under the watch-
* David Stephen King Culhane, Associate, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld,
L.L.P., New York, NY; J.D., New York University School of Law; M. Phil. in Politics,
Magdalen College, University of Oxford; A.B., cum laude, Princeton University.
1. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, GOVERNMENT GA-
ZETrE [GG] No. 15,466, Jan. 28, 1994, at 1.
2. See Independent Electoral Commission Act of 1993; Electoral Act of 1993. Un-
less otherwise stated, all acts passed by the South African government and cited in this
article are published in the GOVERNMENT GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
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ful eyes of a jealous National Party. The Interim Constitution,
the hard-fought result of years of negotiation between the Afri-
can National Congress (the "ANC"), other black South African
resistance organizations, and a plethora of competing social and
political organizations, sets the stage for the drafting of a new
South African Constitution to be created by the winners of elec-
tions held in April, 1994. The African National Congress, as ex-
pected, was the easy victor, garnering 62.65% of the vote.3
Although the ANC has a clear majority in the new South African
government, it does not control the requisite two-thirds of Parlia-
ment necessary to control the drafting of the new constitution.
This article will examine the legal and political history of
apartheid in South Africa and will focus on the white govern-
ment's efforts to manipulate and control the political agenda in
a nation where whites have always constituted a fraction of the
total population.
The history of the institution of apartheid began more than
forty-five years prior to the recent elections which heralded its
demise. On May 26, 1948, white and coloured South Africans4
and reprinted in STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA: CLASSIFIED AND ANNO-
TATED FROM 1910 (Durban, Butterworth Publishers (PTY) Ltd. 1993).
On Friday, May 6, 1994, the Independent Electoral Commission declared the vot-
ing substantially free and fair, despite the logistical problems and accusations of vote
tampering, particularly in the Kwa Zulu - Natal province. Tony Freemantle, It's Final,
Free and Fair ANC Nets 62.6% of Vote, HOUSTON CHRON., May 7, 1994, at Al.
3. John Carlin, ANC Wins Seven Out of Nine Provinces to Complete Landslide; Mandela
Claims 18 Cabinet Posts with 6for National Party and 3for Inkatha - Mbeki Beats Ramaphosa
for Deputy President, INDEP. (London), May 7, 1994, at 12. The National Party received
20.39% of the votes cast, and the Inkatha Freedom Party finished in third place with
10.54%. Id.
4. The Population Registration Act of 1950 formalized the division of South Af-
rica's population into three main racial groups: white, black (African), and Coloured
(a catch-all category including Indians, Asians [except Japanese, who are deemed hon-
orary whites], and persons of mixed descent). John Dugard, a noted South African
legal critic, stated:
Appearance, social acceptance, and descent are the criteria used to deter-
mine a person's racial identity. A white person is one who 'in appearance
obviously is a white person and who is not generally accepted as a Coloured
person; or is generally accepted as a white person and is not in appearance
obviously not a white person' provided that 'a person shall not be classified as
a white person if one of his natural parents has been classified as a Coloured
person or black.' In deciding whether a person is in appearance obviously
white, 'his habits, education, and speech and deportment and demeanor in
general shall be taken into account.' A black (African) person is one 'who is,
or is generally accepted as, a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa.'
A Coloured person is one 'who is not a white person or a black.'
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went to the polls to elect a new Parliament. Going into the elec-
tions, Jan C. Smuts and his United Party' held a comfortable ma-
jority of over fifty seats. Nonetheless, in a dramatic upset gener-
ated by widespread defections from the Labour6 and United Par-
ties, Dr. Daniel F. Malan,7 the leader of the Afrikaner-dominated
Herenigde National Party (the "HNP"), which had campaigned
under the banner of apartheid, emerged victorious with a five
seat majority.' Thus began the era generally known as
"apartheid."
The National Party's apartheid platform was largely an in-
choate one that sought to rally Afrikaner farmers and white ur-
ban workers disillusioned with the post-war Smuts government.9
JOHN DUGARD ET AL., THE LAST YEARS OF APARTHEID: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 9-
10 (1992) (citations omitted).
5. The United Party was formed in 1933 with the merger of the South African and
National Parties. Although intended to deal primarily with the economic crisis, inci-
dent to the worldwide depression and South Africa's decision to retain the gold stan-
dard, the United Party's coalition government, headed by General J.M.B. Hertzog,
passed a number of race-based statutes. These acts included the Representation of Na-
tives Act of 1936 (removing black voters from the common rolls in the Cape Province)
and the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 (which laid the groundwork for the Bantus-
tan policies of the 1950s).
In 1939, Hertzog was replaced by Smuts, an Afrikaner long active in South African
politics. See T.R.H. DAVENPORT, SOUTH AFRICA: A MODERN HISTORY 298-324 (1991).
6. The Labour Party was organized around urban, English-speaking, working-class
whites and, initially, was concerned with the impact of low cost black labor on its con-
stituents. As early as 1912, it formally adopted a policy of segregation in order to pre-
serve "European civilization [and] the permanent maintenance of the white community
in a position of political and economic supremacy." K.L. RosKam, APARTHEID AND DIS-
CRIMINATION 92 (1960). By the 1940s and '50s, however, the party was moving to the
left, reflecting the continuing division between English and Afrikaner voters. During
the early 1950s, the Labour Party ardently opposed the National Party ("NP") and its
apartheid legislation. MARGARET BALLINGER, FROM UNION TO APARTHEID: A TREK TO
ISOLATION 40, 44, 285 (1969).
7. Dr. Malan was an early advocate of Afrikaner nationalism. From his pulpit as
editor of the first Afrikaner daily, Die Burger, he worked to promote the identity and
interests of the Afrikaner population. He wrote in 1912, "[w]e recognize the existence
of an Afrikaner nationalism with which we are in accord, and of which we hope to be a
representative and interpreter." RICHARD POLLAK, Up AGAINST APARTHEID 12 (1981).
Malan's early career as a journalist was followed by a leading role in Afrikaner politics,
culminating in his six-year term as Prime Minister from 1948 to 1954.
8. Out of a total of 150 seats, the Herenigde (reunited) National Party won 70 seats
and its ally, the Afrikaner Party, a further nine. The two parties merged in 1951, form-
ing the National Party, the old HNP in all but name. ANTHONY LEMON, APARTHEID IN
TRANSrrION 46-47 (1987).
9. SHULA MARKS & STANLEY TRAPIDO, SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1976: AN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 6 (1988) (on file with Queen Elizabeth House, Lincoln College, University
of Oxford).
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The term apartheid was first used in Parliamentary debate in
1944 when Dr. Malan stated that the government should "ensure
the safety of the white race and of Christian civilization by the
honest maintenance of the principles of apartheid and guardian-
ship."10 Although South African society had long been based on
racially discriminatory laws and traditions, the electoral success
of the National Party represented a significant turning point.
Since the Boer War" in the early years of the twentieth century,
the Union of South Africa had been ruled by an uneasy coalition
of English and Afrikaner political groups in which the English-
speaking forces held the upper hand.' 2 However, with the elec-
tion of Dr. Malan as Prime Minister in 1948, electoral domi-
nance shifted abruptly to the Afrikaner segment of the white
population.
The National Party moved rapidly to consolidate its control
of the state institutions in order to advance the interests of the
Afrikaners, Afrikaans-speaking whites of predominantly Dutch
descent, over those of other groups within the South African
population. Prior to the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as
President on May 10, 1994, the National Party enjoyed an unin-
terrupted tenure in power for more than forty-five years. In the
wake of the 1948 election, the National Party's initial priority was
defending its majority. It embarked on a policy of entrenching
itself in power by manipulating electoral boundaries, incorporat-
ing South West African seats, and eliminating the coloured vote,
as well as implementing other legislation designed to isolate and
divide the black population." The National Party's assault on
10. LEMON, supra note 8, at 47.
11. The Boer War (1899-1902), fought between the British and the descendants of
Dutch settlers (known derogatively by the British as "Boers" [in Dutch, 'farmers']), was
the culmination of British efforts to seize control of the rich gold and diamond reserves
which had been discovered in the Afrikaner republics of the Transvaal and the Orange
Free State. GEOFFREY WHEATCROFT, THE RANDLORDS: MEN WHO MADE SOUTH AFRCA
207-18 (1985).
12. Following the Boer War, the English sought to unify their control of the Afri-
can sub-continent through the creation, in 1910, of the Union of South Africa. The
Union had a unitary government headed by a Governor-General who represented the
British crown. Domestic administrative power was vested in a bicameral Parliament.
The Prime Minister was invariably an Afrikaner, reflecting the majority of Afrikaners
among the electorate, which was limited to white (and, in the Cape Province, a limited
number of Coloured) males. DAVENPORT, supra note 5, at 220-25.
13. The first of these measures was the Asiatic Laws Amendment Act of 1948, re-
pealing the franchise of Indians in Natal. This law was soon followed by the Separate
Representation of Voters Act of 1951 and the High Court of Parliament Act of 1951,
1994]
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the structures of the South African state generated vociferous,
continuing opposition that in turn prompted far-reaching meas-
ures to suppress dissenters.14 South African civil rights were se-
verely circumscribed in 1948, and a vast majority of the new re-
strictions fell upon the legally oppressed segments of the popula-
tion. The restriction and regulation of speech, both written and
oral, played a central role in the National Party's domination of
South Africa. Although purportedly race-neutral in form and
application, the regulation of speech was in practice a critical
component of the National Party's program of racial oppression.
Regulations inevitably were applied more consistently, compre-
hensively, and harshly against blacks than whites,15 and the regu-
which removed some 47,000 coloured voters from the general voter rolls in the Cape
Province to a separate voter roll entitled to elect four white members to the House of
Assembly and two white or coloured representatives to the Cape Provincial Council.
However, the validity of the Voters Act was successfully challenged in court. Harris and
Others v. Minister of the Interior and Another, 1952 (2) S.A. 428 (A.D.).
The elimination of the franchise for coloured voters ultimately required two subse-
quent acts of Parliament, the Senate Act 53 of 1955 and the South Africa Amendment
Act of 1956, which reconstituted the Senate in order to generate the necessary two-
thirds bicameral vote in Parliament required to alter coloured franchise rights. Collins
v. Minister of the Interior and Another, 1957 (1) S.A. 552 (A.D.).
Other important early legislation included the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act
of 1949 (prohibiting marriages between whites and non-whites); the Immorality
Amendment Act of 1950 (prohibiting interracial sexual relations); the Population Re-
gistration Act 30 of 1950 (one of the two central legislative bases for 'apartheid,' it
required the categorizing and registering of all inhabitants of South Africa by race as
'white', 'coloured,' or 'native,' as well as ethnicity and residence); the Group Areas Act
41 of 1950 (the second principal cornerstone, further enumerating racial and ethnic
categories and allocating specified geographical areas for their exclusive residence); the
Internal Security Act 44 of 1950 (known as the Suppression of Communism Act); the
Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953 (mandating separate public amenities);
and the Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act of 1952 (streamlining
the existing 'pass laws' and providing a new identification book to be carried by all
blacks).
14. See Rex v. Abdurahman, 1950 (3) S.A. 136 (A.D.) (successful protest against
segregated railway facilities).
15. The black community, Gilbert Marcus has noted, "is treated more severely
than other groups in the freedom of expression .... [N]ewspapers and other publica-
tions which serve the black community are only allowed to operate within narrowly
circumscribed limits. When opposition is pitched at the level that it may become effec-
tive, it is suppressed. The effective articulation of opposition is often branded as the
irresponsible abuse of freedom of expression." Gilbert Marcus, Blacks Treated More
Harshly, 13 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 14 (1984); seeJOHN BREwER, AFrER SOWETO: AN UN-
FINISHEDJOURNEY (1986) (noting the "severe harassment suffered by Black authors and
journalists and the injudicious use of banning orders on newspapers and literary
works").
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lation of speech quickly moved to the center of South Africa's
repertoire of instruments of repression and control.
This article will examine the direct and indirect regulation
of political speech16 in a chronological manner, concluding with
the statutory and regulatory environment under State President
Frederik W. de Klerk,17 the Interim Constitution and the events
leading up to the watershed April elections. The direct regula-
tion of political speech in post-1948 South Africa has been ef-
fected primarily through the Suppression of Communism Act",
and its successor, the Internal Security Act of 1982,19 the Publica-
tions and Entertainments Act 20 and its successor, the Publica-
tions Act,2 1 a series of miscellaneous legislation imposing various
substantive restrictions on private and public speech, 22 and fi-
nally, executive emergency regulations promulgated pursuant to
the Public Safety Act.23 These statutes imposed strict limitations
on the dissemination of information and opinion. They are ad-
dressed, in turn, in Section I of this article.
16. It should be noted that in addition to the comprehensive curtailment of polit-
ical speech, South Africa also imposes 'moral' restrictions. See, e.g., Indecent or Ob-
scene Photographic Material Act 37 of 1967.
17. P.W. Botha (Prime Minister, September 28, 1978 to September 5, 1984; State
President, September 5, 1984 to August 14, 1989) retired seven months after a stroke
undermined NP confidence in his leadership. Botha was succeeded, on September 20,
1989, by de Klerk, the leader of the NP, following a brief struggle for succession.
De Klerk rapidly established a new, reformist political agenda. At his inauguration,
he stressed his intention to tackle discriminatory legislation, release political prisoners,
end the state of emergency, and provide for a negotiated transfer of power to a new
multi-racial government. DAVENPORT, supra note 5, at 443-44. On November 29, he
announced his decision to reduce the State Security Council to the level of a Cabinet
sub-committee and put an end to decisions "forced down from the top." Id. at 444.
On the February 2, 1990, de Klerk announced the unbanning of 33 organizations,
including the ANC, the Communist Party of South Africa (the "CPSA"), and the Pan
Africanist Congress (the "PAC"). Persons serving prison sentences on account of their
membership in those organizations were released. Some emergency regulations, in-
cluding a few that governed the media, were lifted. On February 11, Nelson Mandela
was released after 27 years as a political prisoner. Following his release, he was ap-
pointed Deputy President of the ANC and became its chief spokesman.
18. Internal Security Act 44 of 1950, repealed by Act No. 138 of 1991.
19. Internal Security Act 74 of 1982.
20. Publications and Entertainments Act 26 of 1963.
21. Publications Act 42 of 1974.
22. See, e.g., Criminal Law Amendment Act 8 of 1953; Defence Act 44 of 1957; the
Police Act 7 of 1958; Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959; Publications and Entertain-
ment Act 26 of 1963, as amended by the Publications Act 42 of 1974; Publications Amend-
ment Act 44 of 1979; Newspaper and Imprint Registration Act 63 of 1971.
23. Public Safety Act 3 of 1953; Public Safety Amendment Act 67 of 1986.
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The extensive, substantive limitations on political speech,
highlighted in Section I, were further supplemented by laws and
government activities that were designed to inhibit the ability of
South African citizens to disseminate information and opinions
deemed contrary to the interests of the South African state.
These measures, although not specifically tailored to the regula-
tion of speech, played an important role in the suppression of
political opposition in South Africa. They are assessed in Sec-
tion II of this article.
Central to the government's indirect regulation of speech
has been its power to ban and detain individuals without access
to the press, its ability to legally harass and persecute individuals
and organizations perceived as threats to the interests of the
state, and the government's incalculable success at promoting
self-censorship through the accumulation of laws and regula-
tions discussed throughout this paper. Despite the seemingly
monolithic distribution of power in South Africa over the years,
the legal system has been far from static. However, earnest ef-
forts to reconstitute the South African state have occurred only
in the last four years, under the mutual stewardship of State Pres-
ident Frederik W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela,24 the head of
the multi-racial African National Congress, the oldest and most
powerful opposition group in South Africa.25 The two parties
conducted protracted, ongoing negotiations, which culminated
in a defacto and, beginning in September 1993,26 a dejure power-
24. Trained as an attorney, Mandela became active in the African National Con-
gress Youth League in the late 1940s. Following the banning of the ANC in 1960,
Mandela went underground and established a new, militant wing of the ANC, Umkhonto
we Sizwe (the "MK") (translated as "Spear of the Nation"), aiming to sabotage strategic
government installations while sparing human lives. See DAVENPORT, supra note 5, at
364.
Mandela was captured and imprisoned by the government in 1962, and freed in
February of 1990. James Gerstenzang, Bush Wants to Reward de Klerk Reforms, L.A. TIMES,
June 21, 1990, at A19. During his incarceration, he became a legendary figure in the
opposition movement. Since his release, he has been the principle ANC spokesman
and negotiator. On May 10th, 1994 Mandela was officially inaugurated as de Klerk's
successor to the Presidency of the Republic of South Africa. Bashorun Abioka, Time to
Gun for the Military, GuARDIAN, June 17, 1994, at 24.
25. Founded in 1912 by Western-educated black leaders as the South African Na-
tive National Congress ("SANNC"), the ANC marked the ascendancy of the opinion
among middle class blacks that reform would be achieved best through acts of Africans
rather than sympathetic whites. The SANNC became the African National Congress in
1923. The ANC is committed to a multi-racial vision of South Africa.
26. On September 7, 1993, the Nationalist Party agreed to enter into a formal
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sharing arrangement. The government and the ANC endorsed
the Interim Constitution, drafted during the constitutional ne-
gotiations at the World Trade Center in Kempton Park outside
Johannesburg on November 18, 1993 and then ratified on De-
cember 22, 1993. The election of Nelson Mandela will lead to
further constitutional change, as the new Members of Parlia-
ment strive to complete a new Constitution within the two-year
framework implemented under the Interim Constitution. Sec-
tion III will consider the positions of the ANC and the National
Party and will examine the Interim Constitution and seek to
achieve a tentative assessment of the post-election prospects for
free speech in a democratic South Africa. Finally, this article will
present general conclusions regarding South Africa's history of
political repression and the impact of the state's suppression of
political speech.
I. DIRECT REGULATION OF SPEECH
A. The Suppression of Communism Act
After assuming power, the National Party found it necessary
to respond to widespread political opposition, 7 including, in
particular, the nationwide Defiance Campaign28 organized by
the ANC, and a series of uprisings and unrest throughout the
country. 29 The first major legislation introduced by the National
Party, designed to suppress extra-parliamentary opposition, was
power sharing institution, the Transitional Executive Council ("TEC"). This develop-
ment was formally approved by Parliament on September 23, 1993, and the TEC held
its first meetings in early December.
27. In December 1951, the ANC and the South African Indian Congress estab-
lished ajoint Planning Council to organize a civil disobedience campaign for the repeal
of discriminatory legislation. Directed against pass laws, the Group Areas Act, the Sepa-
rate Representation of Voters Act, the Suppression of Communism Act, and the Bantu
Authorities Act, the Defiance Campaign was launched on June 26, 1952. BRIAN BuNr-
ING, THE RISE OF THE SouTH AFRICAN REICH 199-207 (1969).
28. The government responded to the Campaign by enacting the Criminal Laws
Amendment Act (prohibiting the violation of any law by way of protest or as part of a
campaign against any law, and subjecting violators to a R300 fine and/or three years
imprisonment and/or ten lashes) and the Public Safety Act (giving the government the
power to proclaim a state of emergency for a period of up to twelve months).
29. See GOVAN MBEYI, SOUTH AFRICA: THE PEAsANTS REVOLT 116-18, (1964) (citing
widespread rural as well as urban resistance to forced removals under Group Areas Act,
to pass controls and new Bantu Authorities). In the Pondo revolt against the Bantu
Authority's choice of an unpopular contender for Chief in early 1960, over 4,500 peo-
ple were detained and more than 2,000 people were eventually brought to trial. Id.
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the Suppression of Communism Act.30 Presented as an effort to
deter communism, this act was clearly applicable to any move-
ment that sought to promote racial equality.31 Communism was
defined loosely in the act to include any organization
which aims at bringing about any political, industrial, social
or economic change within the Union by the promotion of
disturbance or disorder, by unlawful acts or omissions or by
threats of such acts or omissions or by means which include
the promotion, of disturbances or disorder, or such acts or
omissions or threats.3 2
Another definition provided that "if the Government passes a
law which discriminates against non-Europeans and, therefore,
causes a feeling of hostility between Europeans and non-Europe-
ans, that is not 'communism,' but if anybody protests against that
law in a manner which causes disorder, that is 'communism.' ,3
The extensive reach of the Suppression of Communism Act was
amply illustrated by the prolonged litigation, known as the South
African Treason Trial, which started with the mass arrest of some
140 people in December 1956, extending into the 1960s." In
addition to banning the South African Communist Party, 3 this
act conferred upon the President the power to declare other or-
ganizations unlawful if satisfied that the organization was
an organisation for the promotion of communism, or that
one of its purposes is to promote communism, or that it en-
30. Internal Security Act 44 of 1950; see INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS,
SOUTH AFRICA: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 66 (1988) [hereinafter HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW].
31. Internal Security Act 44 of 1950.
32. Id.
33. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAw, supra note 30, at 51 (citation omitted).
34. Id.
35. The CPSA was founded by whites, some of whom had attempted to organize
urban black workers in 1921. A relatively small, but well organized body, the CPSA
adhered to the doctrine that working class unity transcended racial divisions. The racist
overtones of the 1924 general election, however, prompted the decision that "our main
revolutionary task is among the natives." TOM LODGE, BLACK POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA
SINCE 1945 7 (1983).
By 1928, three members of the central committee were black as were the majority
of the party's 1,750 members. Id. at 9. Following the CPSA's commitment in 1928 to
'an independent native republic as a stage towards a workers' and peasants' republic,"
the CPSA and the ANC entered into a close and long-lasting alliance. Id. The CPSA,
while in exile, was able to maintain a small, albeit underground presence in South
Africa, until being officially recognized in 1989. Members of the CPSA central commit-
tee are still prominent in the ANC and its new government leadership. Id.
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gages in activities which are calculated to further the achieve-
ment of any of the objects referred to in the definition of
communism, or that it is an organisation controlled by an-
other which does any of the things already enumerated, or,
finally, that its purpose is to carry on the activity of any
banned organisation.36
It soon became clear that the State President had wide dis-
cretion when applying the Suppression of Communism Act. The
act, in a series of court cases, was interpreted as rendering a Pres-
idential opinion conclusive if it stated that the requisite illicit
purposes or activities existed.37 Moreover, in S.A. Defence and Aid
Fund v. Minister of Justice,38 the Appellate Division held that an
organization that had been declared unlawful did not have the
right to appeal or otherwise oppose the President's decision.39
Once an organization was declared unlawful, its property vested
automatically in a liquidator appointed by the Minister of Jus-
tice, and its members, as well as non-members, were prohibited
from acting in any way which might advance the aims of the pro-
scribed organization. Acts, as circumscribed as bearing tokens of
membership in such organizations, were illegal.4 ° Citizens re-
ceived prison sentences for displaying official photographs evinc-
ing membership in a banned organization41 or for merely being
in possession of documents indicating prior membership.42 One
of the tasks of the appointed liquidator was to compile a list of
all former officers and active supporters of the organization.
Although individuals were permitted to challenge their inclusion
on this list, if that person remained on the list "[h] is right to par-
ticipate in the public life of the country [was] abolished by a
stroke of the ministerial pen and he [was] thereby condemned,
without open trial, to a ghostly social existence."43 It became a
criminal offense to record, reproduce, print, publish, or dissemi-
nate any speech, writing, utterance, or statement made or pur-
36. Internal Security Act 44 of 1950 § 2(2).
37. See Sachs v. Minister of Justice, 1934 A.D. 11;Jeewa v. Donges N.O., 1950 (3)
S.A. 414 (A.D.); Minister of the Interior v. Bechler, 1948 (3) S.A. 409 (A.D.); S.A. De-
fence and Aid Fund v. Minister of Justice, 1967 (1) S.A. 31 (C), 35.
38. 1967 (1) S.A.L.R. 263 (A.D.).
39. Id. at 275.
40. Internal Security Act 44 of 1950 § 3(1) (a) (ii).
41. See, e.g., State v. Calata, 1961 (4) S.A. 303 (E).
42. S. v. Myende, 1962 (4) S.A. 426 (N).
43. ANTHONY S. MATHEWS, LAw, ORDER AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA 66 (1972).
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ported to have been made by the person who was listed." In
addition, the listed individual was required to notify the police of
any change in residence or employment.45
In conjunction with the Publications and Entertainments
Act4 6 and its successor, the Publications Act,4 7 the Suppression of
Communism Act was the principal mechanism for the restriction
of political speech. The Suppression of Communism Act and its
amending legislation were consolidated and updated in the In-
ternal Security Act of 1982.
B. The Internal Security Act of 1982
The Internal Security Act of 1982,48 the successor to the
Suppression of Communism Act, consolidated most of the ex-
isting security legislation in South Africa. Section 5(1) set forth
sweeping provisions for the prohibition of any periodical or pub-
lication that:
(a) serves inter alia as a means for expressing views or convey-
ing information ... calculated to endanger the security
of the State or the maintenance of law and order;
(b) professes, by its name or otherwise, to be a publication
for propagating the principles or promoting the spread
of communism;
(c) serves inter alia as a means for expressing views or convey-
ing information . . . calculated to further the achieve-
ment of any of the objects of communism;
(d) is published or disseminated by, or under the direction
or guidance of, any organisation which has been de-
clared an unlawful organisation . . ;
(e) serves inter alia as a means for expressing views propagat-
ed by an organisation [declared unlawful];
(f) serves inter alia as a means for expressing views or convey-
ing information . . . calculated to cause, encourage or
foment feelings of hostility between different population
groups of the Republic; or
44. Internal Security Act 44 of 1950 § I1(g).
45. Id.; Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955, repealed by Act No. 51 of 1977.
46. Publications and Entertainments Act 26 of 1963.
47. Publications Act 44 of 1979.
48. Internal Security Act 74 of 1982.
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(g) is a continuation of, or substitution for, whether or not
under another name, any periodical or other publication
the printing, publication or dissemination of which has
been prohibited in terms of this section.4 9
Subsection (f), in particular, represented an extension of the
traditional restrictions on political expression. In addition, sec-
tion 66 authorized the responsible minister or the administrator
of a province to restrict access to information if its production to
a court or commission of enquiry would prejudice state security.
Such a claim, if made in proper form, was conclusive and no
court could order or permit the information to be given as evi-
dence. The provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1982 were,
in turn, supplemented by the State of Emergency declared in
1985, pursuant to the Public Safety Act,5° which further en-
hanced the government's censorship powers.
C. The Publications and Entertainment Act
The Publications and Entertainments Act51 established the
Publications Control Board (the "PCB"), a government agency
charged with reviewing all publications and public entertain-
ments. Distribution or possession of any document deemed "un-
desirable"5 2 by the PCB was a criminal offense. Section 5 of the
Publications and Entertainments Act provided that a document
was undesirable if it was blasphemous or offensive to the reli-
gious feelings of a section of the inhabitants of the Republic;53 if
it was indecent, obscene, or offensive or harmful to public
morals;54 or if it was harmful to relations between sections of the
inhabitants of the Republic and prejudicial to the safety of the
state, the peace or good order.55 The language and criteria for
determining the undesirability of a publication or object were
retained by the Publications Act 56 and will be considered in
more detail in the next section of this article.
49. Id. § 5(1).
50. Public Safety Act 3 of 1953.
51. Publications and Entertainments Act 26 of 1963.
52. See Buren Uitgewers (Edms.) Bpk. en'n Ander v. Raad van Beheer oor Pub-
likasies, 1975 (1) S.A. 379 (C) (defining and discussing the term 'undesirable').
53. Publications and Entertainments Act § 5(2) (b).
54. Id. §§ 5(2) (a), 6.
55. Id. § 5(2)(d).
56. Publications Act 42 of 1974.
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Section 8 (1) (d) of the Publication and Entertainments Act
provided that no person shall "possess any publication or object,
if the possession of that publication or object has been prohib-
ited under section 9(3) and that prohibition has been made
known by notice in the [Government] Gazette."'5 7 Decisions by the
PCB were reviewable by the courts and could be vacated by the
Supreme Court. J.C.W. van Rooyen, the Director of the Publica-
tions Appeal Board in the 1980s, noted that the Supreme Court
regularly set aside the decisions of the Publications Control
Board.5" However, the appeal process was costly, resulting in
many books remaining banned.59 In its ten years of existence,
the Publications and Entertainments Act was responsible for the
banning of more than 8,500 publications.60
D. The Publications Act
According to the Publications Act,6" publication or distribu-
tion of any document62 (not including newspapers published by
publishers who are members of the Newspaper Press Union of
South Africa (the "NPU") ,63 or posters advertising such newspa-
57. Publications and Entertainments Act § 8(1)(d). For a definition of "publica-
tion or object," see Publications Control Board v. Central News Agency, Ltd., 1970 (3)
S.A. 479, 483-88 (A.D.); Pillay v. Publications Control Board, 1971 (4)'S.A. 208 (D).
58. J.C.W. VAN ROOYEN, CENSORSHIP IN SOUTH AFRICA: BEING A COMMENTARY ON
THE APPLICATION OF THE PUBLICATIONS ACT 14 (1987).
59. Id. at 14.
60. Marcus, supra note 15, at 15.
61. Publications Act 42 of 1974.
62. See S. v. Waldbaum, 1973 (3) S.A. 181 (T) (prohibiting production of any mate-
rial "intended to be exhibited in public"). Whether an object was "intended to be ex-
hibited in public" depended "not upon the subjective intention of some particular per-
son ... but upon objective criteria" including "the nature and quality" of the object, its
'public appeal," and "by whom it was produced and distributed." Id. at 182 (citing S. v.
Film Hire (Pty.) Ltd. and Others, 1972 (3) S.A. 697, at 702).
63. All NPU member publications subscribed to the Media Council's Code of Con-
duct. The Media Council, the successor to the Press Council, was a "voluntary self-
disciplinary tribunal." The South African Media Council was formed on September 1,
1983, in order to side-step the direct control of the press as advocated by the Steyn
Commission (1980 and 1982). P.D. Diederichs, The Printed Media in the Republic of South
Africa, in SOUTH AFRICAN CONSULATE GENERAL, SOUTH AFRICAN BRIEFING PAPER No. 30 4
(1990). For a discussion of the Steyn Commission and the Media Council, see DAVEN-
PORT, supra note 5, at 543, 545.
The Media Council adjudicated complaints that press reports or photographs were
factually incorrect, contained unfair comment, endangered state security or law and
order, were harmful to race relations, were obscene or lascivious, or violated an individ-
ual's privacy. The Media: South Africa 1991-1992, in PUBLICATIONS DIISION 'OF THE
SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNICATION SERVICE, OFFICIAL YEARBOOK OF THE REPUBLIC OF
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pers) I could be prohibited if the document was deemed "unde-
sirable."65 With the exception noted above, the Publications Act
applied to all newspapers published by publishers who were not
members of the Newspaper Press Union of South Africa,66 as
well as all books, periodicals, pamphlets, posters, and other
printed matter; other writings which were duplicated or made
available to the public; all drawings and photographs; figures,
casts, carvings, or statues; and all records or other objects in or
on which sounds were recorded for reproduction.67
The Publications Act established extensive criteria for deter-
mining whether a publication or document6" was "undesir-
able."69 Under section 47(2), a publication or document was
deemed to be "undesirable" if it or any part of it
(a) is indecent or obscene or is offensive or harmful to pub-
lic morals;
(b) is blasphemous or is offensive to the religious convictions
or feelings of any section of the inhabitants of the Repub-
lic;
(c) brings any section of the inhabitants of the Republic into
ridicule or contempt;
(d) is harmful to the relations between any sections of the
inhabitants of the Republic;
(e) is prejudicial to the safety of the State, the general wel-
fare or the peace and good order;
SOUTH AFRicA. The Council was empowered to reprimand publications and journalists,
require published retractions, and impose fines not exceeding R10,000. Diederichs,
supra, at 4.
The Media Council effectively functioned as a civil counterpart to the Publications
Act. The objectivity and independence of the Council were at best suspect. For exam-
ple, in December of 1990, Professor van Rooyen, former chairman of the Publications
Appeal Board, was elected chairman of the Council.
64. Publications Act § 47(2).
65. Id. § 8.
66. Although the majority of South African newspapers were members of the NPU,
there were a number of important exceptions. The "alternative" newspapers, including
New Nation, Umsebenzi (The Worker, newspaper of the CPSA), and the Weekly Mail, all
refused to join.
67. KELSEY WILLIAM STUART, THE NEWSPAPERMAN's GUIDE TO THE LAW 13 (1982). A
"publication" is an object that is either "published or intended to be published." S. v.
Russell, 1981 (2) S.A. 21 (C), 31.
68. Id.
69. The Cape Provincial Division has noted that once a party has been charged
with possession of an undesirable publication, the undesirability of the publication is
not subject to judicial inquiry. Kahanowitz v. Regional Magistrate, Cape Town, and
Another, 1979 (2) S.A. 227 (C), 229-30.
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(f) discloses with reference to any judicial proceedings -
(i) any matter which is indecent or obscene or is offen-
sive to public morals;
(ii) any indecent or obscene medical, surgical or physio-
logical details the disclosure of which is likely to be
offensive or harmful to public morals.70
Studies indicated that "by far the majority of publications found
to be undesirable each year were prohibited in terms of
§ 47(2) (e) of the Act."71
The Publications Act clearly cast a wide net. The standards
established by the Publications Act were subjective and easily
triggered. If the publication or object was "undesirable," then
the party who produced or distributed 72 that material was sub-
ject to the provisions of section 8, which provided that no person
should:
(i) produce an undesirable publication or object; or
(ii) distribute a publication or object, if that publication or
object is in terms of a decision of a committee appointed
in terms of section 4 undesirable and that decision has
been made known by notice in the Government Gazette; or
(iii) distribute a publication or object in conflict with any
condition imposed under the Act in respect of the distri-
bution thereof, if such imposition has been made known
by notice in the Government Gazette; or
(iv) except on the authority of a permit issued under section
12(2), distribute any edition or publication or object, if
the distribution of that edition has been prohibited
under section 9(2) and that prohibition has been made
known by notice in the Government Gazette; or
(v) possess any publication or object, if the possession of
that publication or object has been prohibited under
section 9(3) and that prohibition has been made known
by notice in the Government Gazette; or
(vi) except on the authority of a permit issued under section
12(2), import any publication or object, if the importa-
tion of that publication or object has been prohibited
under section 9(4) and that prohibition has been made
known by notice in the Government Gazette.
The appropriate definition of "undesirable" was the focus of
70. Publications Act 42 of 1974 § 47(2).
71. Marcus, supra note 15, at 19.
72. Publications Act § 47(4).
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considerable discussion. Kelsey Stuart commented that in prac-
tice "what is considered undesirable is certain political material
particularly of a communistic nature, material which places an
accent on violence, pictures and stories about the intermingling
of Whites and members of other racial groups and material
likely to cause disharmony amongst the various racial groups in
the Republic.""3 John Dugard reached a similar conclusion:
[The Publications Board] has not hesitated to prohibit...
works containing trenchant criticism of institutions of the
State (particularly the police and the defence force), the ad-
ministration ofjustice and the politico-legal apparatus of sep-
arate development; sympathetic treatment of black liberation
movements and radical opponents of the status quo; and sensi-
tive accounts of inter-racial sexual relations. 74
Application of the Publications Act was somewhat tempered by
the judicial decision that the determination of undesirability
should consider the reactions of the "probable reader."75
The Publications Act provided for three autonomous bodies
to police and enforce it. The Directorate of Publications, under
the auspices and general supervision of the Minister of Home
Affairs, was the administrative agency that applied the Publica-
tions Act.76 The second body was made up of publications com-
mittees which reviewed controversial objects or publications."
Finally, the Publications Appeal Board (PAB), whose fourteen
members were appointed by the State President, reviewed and
adjudicated committee decisions subject to appeal. 7
Moreover, given the fact that the vast majority of queries
regarding the desirability of an object or publication were initi-
ated by persons with no vested interest in the desirability of the
object or publication, appeals were greatly limited. 79 The Publi-
73. STUART, supra note 67, at 14-15.
74. JOHN DUGARD, WHAT HAPPENED TO BURGER'S DAUGHTER OR How SOUTH AFRI-
CAN CENSORSHIP WoRmS 72 (1980).
75. Human en Rousseau Uitgewers (Edms.) Bpk. v. Snyman, N.O., 1978 (3) S.A.
836. It should be noted that this "probable reader" standard, welcomed by van Rooyen
as a sign of moderate, sophisticated censorship, was inherently subjective. As in Human,
it was generally applied to works by Afrikaners. In reality, therefore, the standard re-
sulted in stricter enforcement against the works of non-Afrikaners.
76. Publications Act §§ 2-3.
77. Id. § 4.
78. Id. §§ 13, 35, 35(a)-(b).
79. Marcus, supra note 15, at 16.
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cations Act provided for very limited post-PAB review.8" Subse-
quent appeals were heard by a panel of three Supreme Court
judges who could overrule the finding of the PAB only if they
found that the PAB acted in bad faith. Only upon finding that
the PAB acted in bad faith could the panel consider the undesir-
ability of the publication or film."
Objects or publications became subject to review in several
ways. A private individual could urge the Publications Director-
ate to find a work undesirable and, thereby, subject the work to
mandatory review.8" Moreover, if no private party challenged
the desirability of a work, the Minister of Home Affairs or the
Publications Directorate, on its own initiative, could require re-
view. Any film or videocassette, by contrast, had to receive ap-
proval prior to screening.8"
Section 17 of the Publications Act conferred broad powers
upon the state to "enter, examine and seize" where there were
reasonable grounds to suspect that an undesirable publication
or object was being produced, exhibited, or hired out to the
public. The vast majority of challenges to the desirability of pub-
lications were commenced by the state. During the period be-
tween 1976 and 1982, five to nine percent of all annual chal-
lenges originated from the public, eight to ten percent were ini-
tiated by publishers, and seventy-eight to eighty-four percent
were initiated by police and customs officials.84
With regard to the specific criteria for undesirability, a "sec-
tion of the population" was defined as "a substantial number of
people who as a result of an inherent characteristic or character-
istics regard themselves as a distinctive community and are ac-
cepted as such by the rest of the community."85 Although the
PAB regarded general religious denominations as sections of the
population, a specific church denomination was not necessarily
so distinct from others with similar religious convictions that it
could be regarded as a section by itself.86 In addition, the appli-
cation of the terms "ridiculing" or "bringing into contempt"
80. Publications Act § 36.
81. Id. §§ 38, 38(a), 39.
82. VAN RoOYEN, supra note 57, at 90-91.
83. Publications Act §§ 19-22.
84. Marcus, supra note 15, at 16.
85. VAN ROOYEN, supra note 57, at 90-91.
86. Id. at 91.
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were interpreted rather narrowly. The courts determined that
ordinary scorn or political criticism was not sufficient for a find-
ing of undesirability. The material had to rise to the level of
degrading, humiliating, or ignominious."
It should be noted that the sanctions prescribed by the Pub-
lications Act were open-ended. The author or printer of a publi-
cation was subject to prosecution if a committee found the publi-
cation to be undesirable at some date after distribution had
taken place.88 It is significant, as one commentator noted, that
"[a] lthough one might argue that this is an extremely strict provi-
sion, it must be borne in mind that the accused must at least
foresee the possibility that what he is producing might be unde-
sirable (dolus eventualis)."'9 It seems clear that Parliament wel-
comed the potential deterrent effect of this law: if it was able to
induce self-censorship, the Parliament was saved the trouble of
post-hoc censorship and banning. This deterrent effect was suf-
ficient enough, in 1988, to prevent the screening of the film Cry
Freedom.90 Although the film was not explicitly banned, the gov-
ernment refused to assure cinemas and distributors that they
would not be prosecuted under the Publications or Internal Se-
curity Acts.
Similarly, as a black-oriented, politically-progressive press
evolved over the last twenty years, 91 it was particularly susceptible
to government pressures.92 For instance, the first issue of Staf
87. S. v. Tanteli, 1975 (2) S.A. 772 (T), 774 (E).
88. VAN ROOVEN, supra note 57, at 18.
89. Id. at 18.
90. Cry Freedom was a dramatization of the life of Steven Biko, a leader in Port
Elizabeth. Biko was banned and eventually killed at the hands of the South African
Police. See generally STEVEN BIKO, I WRITE WHAT I LIKE (1978); GAIL GERHART, BLACK
POWER IN SOUTH AFRICA (1978); BARUCH WILSON, YEAR OF FIRE, YEAR OF ASH: THE
SOWETO REVOLT: ROOTS OF A REVOLUTION (1979);JOHN KANE-BERMAN, SowETo: BLACK
REVOLT, WHITE REACTION (1978).
91. Members of this group include David Philip, Ravan Press, Ad Donker,
Skotaville Press, and the newspapers, New Nation and Weekly Mail.
92. The New Nation, sponsored by the South African Catholic Bishop's Confer-
ence, is edited by Zwelakhe Sisulu, the son of Walter Sisulu, an ANC leader imprisoned
with Nelson Mandela. The New Nation, under the 'apartheid' government, was given
repeated warnings and bannings by the state. Newspapers Protest at Reporting Restrictions,
ECONOMIST PUBLICATIONS LTD., May 7, 1987. In addition, banning restrictions were im-
posed on the newspaper's reporters. Id.
The Weekly Mail was founded by former editors of the liberal Rand Daily Mail after
the latter was closed down by its owner, Anglo American Corporation. Gavin Bell, Press
Challenge in South Africa, TIMES (London),June 21, 1990. The editors and reporters of
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frider, published by Ravan Press, was banned for undermining
the authority and image of the police, using "offensive language"
calculated to harm "Black-White relations," and publishing mate-
rial prejudicial to peace and good order. In contrast, the next
four issues were not found to be undesirable due to voluntary
censorship by the publishers.93
Finally, sections 37 and 37A of the Publications Act dealt
with "contempt of commission." The former provided that no
person should insult, disparage, or belittle any member of the
Publications Appeal Board, or prejudice, influence, or anticipate
the proceedings or findings of the board, or do anything in rela-
tion to the appeal board which, if done in relation to a court of
law, would constitute contempt of court.94 Section 37A similarly
proscribed influencing, prejudicing, or anticipating the deci-
sions of the directorate or any committee. Conviction under
either of these sections was punishable by six months imprison-
ment or a fine of up to R500, or both. 95 The application of these
contempt provisions was defined by the court in Erasmus v. S. A.
Associated Newspapers,9 6 which was cited with approval in S. v.
Sparks N.O. and Others.97
E. Newspaper and Imprint Registration Act
The Newspaper and Imprint Registration Act98 provided for
the registration of newspapers and imprints and governed cer-
tain duties of printers in connection with printed matter other
than newspapers. Newspapers were defined as "periodical publi-
cation[s] published at intervals not exceeding one month and
consisting wholly or for the greater part of political or other
news or of articles relating thereto or to other current topics,
the Daily Mail were prosecuted for exposes on prison conditions in the 1960s, its cover-
age of the Muldergate scandal in the 1970s, and its critiques of the government in the
1980s. The Daily Mails editor, Allister Sparks, was particularly known for his opposition
to apartheid. The Weekly Mail, like the New Nation, has endured frequent government
warnings, prosecutions, and bannings, although its publication was interrupted less fre-
quently than the New Nation.
93. BREWER, supra note 15, at 314-15.
94. Publications Act § 37(1) (a)-(c).
95. Id. § 43(2).
96. Erasmus v. S.A. Associated Newspapers, 1979 (3) S.A. 447 (W).
97. S. v. Sparks N.O. and Others, 1980 (3) S.A. 952 (T.P.D.); see Smalberger and
Another v. Cape Times Ltd. and Others, 1979 (3) S.A. 457 (C).
98. Newspaper and Imprint Registration Act 63 of 1971, as amended by Act 98 of
1982 and Act 138 of 1991.
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with or without illustrations, but did not include any publication
not intended for public sale or public dissemination."99 The act
prohibited the publication of any unregistered newspaper, and
prescribed procedures for registration. 10 Printers of other mat-
ter, not including newspapers, were required to print their name
and address on such printed matter. 01 Where there was any
doubt as to whether printed matter was intended for distribu-
tion, the printer had the burden of proving that it was not.'
Registering a newspaper required the payment of a fee,
originally R20,000 and later increased to R40,000. 10 If a news-
paper was subsequently prohibited under section 6, the deposit
was forfeited at the discretion of the Minister of the Interior.
Punishment for violations of the Act included six months impris-
onment, a R500 fine, or both.104 Writing in 1985, one author'0 5
noted how, even without formal newspaper censorship, the press
was nevertheless subjected to an estimated 100 laws and regula-
tions designed to curb their political activism.
10 6
F. Miscellaneous Substantive Restrictions
Literally dozens of statutes and regulations under apartheid
contained procedural and substantive limitations on informa-
tion that could be published or otherwise disseminated. Impor-
tant among these many legislative acts were: the Correctional
Services Act (the "Prisons Act");1"7 the Police Act;'0 8 the Official
Secrets Act;1 9 the Terrorism Act;" 0 and acts governing military
99. Id. § 1(1). See S. v. Griffiths (Pty) Ltd. and Another, 1974 (1) S.A. 154 (NP.D.)
(printed matter); S. v. Davidson and Bernhardt Promotions (Pty) Ltd. and Others, 1983
(1) S.A. 676 (T.P.D.); Ritch v.Jane Raphaely & Associates (Pty) Ltd. and Another, 1984
(4) S.A. 334 (T.P.D.) (newspaper).
100. Newspaper and Imprint Registration Act §§ 2-8(a).
101. Id. § 9; see S. v. Griffiths (Pty) Ltd. and Another, 1974 (1) S.A. 154, 158
(N.P.D.).
102. Newspaper and Imprint Registration Act § 11 (2); see S. v. Davidson and Bern-
hardt Promotions (Pty) Ltd. and Others, 1983 (1) S.A. 676, 683 (T.P.D.).
103. Newspaper and Imprint Registration Act §§ 4, 13; Suppression of Commu-
nism Act § 6, as amended by Act 76 of 1962.
104. Newspaper and Imprint Registration Act § 11.
105. This commentator is Mr. Uys, a former political editor of the Johannesburg
Sunday Times and South African correspondent of the Guardian and Observer.
106. Stanley Uys, A Silenced Voice, 14 INDEX ON CENSORSHiP 7 (1985).
107. Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959.
108. Police Act 7 of 1958.
109. Official Secrets Act 16 of 1956, repealed by Protection of Information Act 84 of
1982.
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and energy production.
The Prisons Act proscribed making or publishing a sketch
or photograph of any prison, prisoner, or group of prisoners
without the written authority of the Commissioner of Correc-
tional Services. 1 This restriction was clearly designed to deter
the press from reporting the treatment of prisoners, the preva-
lence of political resistance, and the severity of the state's re-
sponse to political opposition. A number of newspapers were
prosecuted under the Prisons Act for publishing photographs of
prisoners. 12
These restrictions, in turn, prompted a number of publica-
tions to emphasize the comprehensive restrictions on the press.
Alternative, opposition newspapers such as the Weekly Mail and
the Afrikaans Vrya Weekblad, regularly printed blank spaces and
blacked out copy in their editions. 3 Furthermore, these news-
papers frequently distributed photographs and posters of
Mandela, Sisulu, and other imprisoned leaders with the word
"banned" printed on them, and hence obscuring their faces in
ostensible compliance with the Prisons Act. The Prisons Act sim-
ilarly proscribed publishing or causing to be published, "any
false information concerning the behavior or experience in
prison of any prisoner or ex-prisoner or concerning the adminis-
tration of any prison" 4 or "any writing, statement, life story or
biographical sketch of a prisoner unless the writing, statement,
life story or biographical sketch was admitted in evidence at the
trial of that prisoner."115 Violations of these provisions were
punishable by a fine of up to R8,000 or two years imprisonment,
110. Terrorism Act 83 of 1967, repealed by Act 138 of 1991.
111. Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959 § 44(e); see S. v. Paterson, 1977 (1) S.A. 27
(E.C.D.); S. v. Bestall, 1986 (3) S.A. 761 (C.P.D.); Attorney-General, Cape v. Bestall,
1988 (3) S.A.,555 (A.D.).
112. For example, the newspapers, the Star and Sowetan, were prosecuted in 1989
for publishing pictures of anti-apartheid leaders two days before they left prison. South
Africa: Media Restrictions in South Africa Are Expected to be Lifted, UK Piu~ss GAZETTE, Dec.
11, 1989, at 18.
113. South Africa: Censors Crack Down on Weekly Mail and Vya Weekblad Newspapers,
UK PREss GAZETtE, May 25, 1992, at 17.
114. Correctional Services Act § 44(0, repealed by the Correctional Services Amend-
ment Act 80 of 1992; see S. v. Kiley, 1962 (3) S.A. 318 (T.P.D.); S. v. van Schalkwyk, 1966
(1) S.A. 172 (T.P.D.); S. v. Theron, 1968 (4) S.A. 61 (T.P.D.); S. v. SA Associated News-
papers Ltd and Others, 1970 (1) S.A. 469 (W.L.D.).
115. Correctional Services Act § 44(g).
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or both. 116
The restrictions set forth in the Police Act 1 7 closely paral-
leled those in the Prisons Act. The Police Act prohibited the
making or publishing of sketches or photographs of any person
"detained in lawful custody or who is a fugitive after he has es-
caped from such custody.""1 8 This act also forbade the publish-
ing of any untrue matter about the police force or about any
member of the force in relation to the performance of their
functions without having reasonable grounds for believing the
statement to be true. 119 The onus of establishing reasonable
grounds fell on the publisher. If the publisher failed to dis-
charge it, the party was liable for R10,000 or imprisonment not
exceeding five years, or both.1 20 Because the Police Act prohib-
ited publication of "untrue matter," as opposed to the prohibi-
tion of publishing "false information" under the Prison Act, the
Police Act cast a wider net.121 Nevertheless, restrictive interpre-
tation would confine the disparity to allegations of fact. 122 Sec-
tion 35 of the Police Act prohibited all members of the Security
Force, including the Reserve Police Force, from membership in
any political organization.1 23 This act did not prohibit attending
public meetings or voting. In 1992, this prohibition was ex-
panded to bar such individuals from standing for elective of-
fice. 1 2 4
The Official Secrets Act 125 made it an offense to publish or
communicate any material or information relating to "any mili-
tary or police matter" or to any other person "in any manner or
for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the Re-
116. Id.
117. Police Act 7 of 1958.
118. Id. § 27(a), as amended by Police Amendment Act 90 of 1977 § 8.
119. The Police Act incorporated the Railway Police in the regular police force
and repealed the South African Transport Services Act 65 of 1981, which prohibited the
publication of any untrue matter in regard to the actions of the Railway Police. See
Police Amendment Act 83 of 1986.
120. Police Act 7 of 1958 § 27(b)(1), as amended by Police Amendment Act 64 of
1979, as repealed by Police Amendment Act 23 of 1992 § 4.
121. See ANTHONY S. MATHEWS, FREEDOM STATE SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 154
(1986) (citation omitted).
122. Id.
123. Police Act 7 of 1958 § 35(1).
124. Police Second Amendment Act 118 of 1992 § 1.
125. Official Secrets Act 16 of 1956.
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public."' 26 This act defined "police matter" as "any matter relat-
ing to the preservation of the internal security of the Republic or
the maintenance of law and order by the South African po-
lice."' 127
The Terrorism Act128 was similarly used to suppress political
expression. In 1974, black theater groups in Johannesburg were
banned for participating in "terroristic activities" in contraven-
tion of sections 2, 4, and 5.129 In the 1980s, a confidential mem-
orandum issued by the Chief of the South African Defence
Force, entitled "Guidelines on Statements in Respect of Sabo-
tage and Terrorism," noted that "while the need exists for the
general public to be informed and reassured concerning acts of
terrorism .. .keeping the public informed must be weighed
against providing the enemy with intelligence .... As a general
rule, 'the least said, the better.' "130 This directive appeared to
operate on an ideological level. Following the uprising in the
black township of Soweto in 1976, the South African government
attempted to suppress all information about the political de-
mands of its opponents. The rationale of the Minister of Law
and Order, Louis le Grange, was simple: "Terrorists want public-
ity for their demands in order to inspire their followers." 31
The National Supplies Procurement Act'3 2 allowed the Min-
ister of Industries, Commerce and Tourism to prohibit the dis-
closure of information regarding goods or services provided to
or requisitioned by the State."33 The Petroleum Products Act 3 4
prescribed expansive limitations with regard to information
about petroleum products 3 and was paralleled by the Atomic
126. Id. § 3.
127. Id.
128. Terrorism Act 83 of 1967.
129. BREWER, supra note 15, at 306.
130. Julie Frederikse, South Africa's Media: The Commercial Press and the Seedlings of
the Future, 9 THIIR WORLD Q. 638, 639 (1987).
131. Id. at 640.
132. National Supplies Procurement Act 89 of 1970.
133. See id. § 8A (prohibiting the disclosure of certain information); id. § 8B (em-
powering the Minister from time to time to prohibit disclosure of specified informa-
tion); id. § 8C (allowing the Minister to enter into self-regulatory agreements with pub-
lishers, or associations such as the National Press Union, in order to exempt their publi-
cations from direct criminal sanctions).
134. Petroleum Products Act 120 of 1977, as amended by Petroleum Products
Amendment Act 72 of 1979.
135. Id. Section 4A(1) declares:
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Energy Act. 136 The Armaments Development and Production
Act 13 7 provided that the publication of any information that
might be construed as an instigation or incitement to strike was
prohibited. 38
G. Emergency Law
In broad terms, the Public Safety Act 139 empowered the
State President to declare a state of emergency if he was of the
opinion that public order was seriously threatened 40 and that
the ordinary law of the land was incapable of allowing the gov-
ernment to control the situation."' The opinion of the State
President, that public order was seriously threatened, was pre-
sumptively valid unless the party seeking to appeal it could estab-
lish bad faith.'42 A state of emergency, which could antedate the
proclamation by up to four days, could remain in force for up to
one year, though capable of indefinite renewal.
14 3
Emergency regulations promulgated by the State President
under the Public Safety Act needed to be tabled within fourteen
days of promulgation, or if Parliament was not in session, within
fourteen days of the next ordinary session.1 44 The tabling provi-
sion, however, did not apply to legislation made under authority
delegated to some person or body by the State President,1 45 thus
providing for the circumvention of Parliamentary review. By no-
tice in the Government Gazette, the Minister of Law and Order
could exercise any of the powers afforded the President, if the
No person shall publish in any newspaper, periodical, book or pamphlet or by
radio, television or any other means -
(i) the source, manufacture, transportation, destination, storage, quan-
tity or stock level of any petroleum products acquired or manufac-
tured or being acquired or manufactured for or in the Republic.
Petroleum Products Act § 4A(1). This act similarly prohibits statements, comments, or
rumors calculated directly or indirectly to convey such information. Id. § 4A(1) (b).
136. Atomic Energy Act 90 of 1967, as amended by Act 46 of 1978 and Act 7 of 1981.
137. Armaments Development and Production Act 57 of 1968, as amended by Act
86 of 1980.
138. STUART, supra note 67, at 181-82.
139. Public Safety Act 3 of 1953.
140. Id. § 2.
141. Id. § 2(c).
142. Stanton v. Minister of Justice, 1960 (3) S.A. 353 (T.P.D.) at 357.
143. Public Safety Act 3 of 1953 § 2.
144. Id. § 3(5); see MATHEWS, supra note 43, at 223.
145. MATHEWS, supra note 43, at 223.
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Minister was of the opinion that it was urgent t4 6 Ministerial
proclamations, however, expired after ten days time.
14 7
The State President exercised this authority on two notewor-
thy occasions: once for five months in 1960 following the
Sharpeville massacre,1 48 and a second time on July 21, 1985, fol-
lowing widespread protests and unrest precipitated by the Con-
stitution Act 1 49 and a severe recession. More recently, the gov-
ernment declared a state of emergency in selected areas of Kwa
Zulu-Natal, preceding the April elections, in response to wide-
spread fighting in the province between supporters of the ANC
and the Inkatha Freedom Party.
When the Public Safety Act was originally introduced, it was
considered a radical measure, giving powers to the Executive
usually reserved for times of war. As such, it bore a striking re-
semblance to the War Measures Act of 1940, which authorized
the governor-general to make regulations that appeared neces-
sary or expedient for the defense of the Union, the safety of the
public, the maintenance of public order, and the effective execu-
tion of war. 15 0 In conjunction with the Criminal Law Amend-
ment Act,' the Public Safety Act was intended to bring a quick
end to the Defiance Campaign being conducted by the ANC. 15 2
146. Id.
147. Public Safety Act 3 of 1953 § 4.
148. During the Sharpeville massacre, which occurred on March 21, 1960, security
forces fired into crowds protesting pass controls, killing 69 people and injuring another
180. This massacre was followed by nationwide protests and unrest. On March 30th,
the ANC and PAC were banned and a state of emergency was declared. The state of
emergency, which was declared in 80 districts of the country, lasted until August 31,
1960.
149. Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983. The Constitution Act
created a tricameral Parliament of separately elected White, Coloured, and Indian
houses. Each was responsible for limited "own affairs" while the President and the
White House of Assembly retained control over "general affairs." "General affairs" were
defined as matters affecting more than one of the country's ethnic groups, foreign
affairs, defense, the police, and commerce. "Own affairs," by contrast, included educa-
tion, culture, housing, and welfare, although fiscal authority remained the province of
the White House of Assembly. Id.
150. DuGARD ET AL., THE LAST YEARS OF APARTHEID 33 (1992).
151. Criminal Law Amendment Act 8 of 1953, as repealed by Internal Security Act 74
of 1982.
152. The Criminal Law Amendment Act was credited with making "any repetition
of the Defiance Campaign impractical: civil disobedience would only be encouraged
again by ANC leaders in 1958 with the women's pass protests in Johannesburg and even
here there was disagreement over this within the leadership of the ANC." LODGE, supra
note 35, at 68.
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Although never used during the 1950's, its deterrent effect was
clear. The Defiance Campaign ground to a halt in late 1952,
paralyzed by rioting in Port Elizabeth and East London, 153 and
harsh nationwide police crackdowns.
Despite the fact that the Public Safety Act was intended
merely as a deterrent to unrest, it was nevertheless used within
ten years of its adoption, as noted above. Following the
Sharpeville massacre, the government declared a state of emer-
gency and issued Proclamation 400,'11 which prohibited a wide
range of meetings, imposed strict controls on the entry and exit
from affected areas, restricted political expression, and allowed
the government to ban political activists. The 1960 state of
emergency was marked by widespread arrest and detention, with
over 11,000 detained in the course of five months.155 The state
of emergency was declared in eighty-two magisterial districts on
March 30, 1960. On April 1, the emergency was extended to
another thirty-one districts, with eight more added on April 11,
1960. Beginning in mid-May, the emergency was slowly lifted,
and was finally withdrawn on August 31, 1960.156 A large
number of the state of emergency regulations, issued in 1960,
affected political speech.1 57 Magistrates or commissioned police
or defense officers were authorized to prohibit any or all gather-
ings or processions, with the exception of certain religious, legal,
or educational functions. 58 Government officials were further
authorized to arrest and detain, without trial, individuals sus-
pected of representing any threat to the public welfare. 59 Fi-
nally, the Minister of Justice was empowered (a) to investigate
any organization suspected of being "connected with any matter
153. Id. at 52.
154. Proclamation 400, GG No. 11, 1960. This regulation remained in effect
through 1964. GoVAN MBEKI, SOUTH AFICA: THE PE.ASANTS' REVOLT 128 (1972).
155. SOUTH AFRCA INSTrrUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, A SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS IN
SOUTH AFRICA 52 (1961).
156. Id.
157. See Proclamation 91, GG No. 6403, Mar. 30, 1960, as amended by Proclamation
97, GG No. 6407, Apr. 2, 1960; Proclamation 127, GG No. 6425, Apr. 22, 1960; Procla-
mation 139, GG No. 6432, Apr. 28, 1960; Proclamation 151, GG No. 6439, May 3, 1960;
Proclamation 167, GG No. 6452, May 17, 1960.
158. MATHEWS, supra note 121, at 224-25. These regulations undoubtedly contrib-
uted to the later politicization of black churches and funerals. Funerals, in particular,
often served as the pretext for large, semi-spontaneous, anti-government political ral-
lies. Id.
159. Regulation 4, Government Notice 551, GG No. 6416, Apr. 11, 1960.
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relating to the state of emergency;" and, by notice in the Govern-
ment Gazette, (b) to direct any association, corporated or unincor-
porated, to discontinue its activities;16 and (c) to ban publica-
tions or to prohibit any person or association of persons from
publishing material deemed by him to be subversive.161 Again,
the Minister's determination was deemed presumptively valid.1 62
Pursuant to these regulations, the ANC and the Pan Africanist
Congress (the "PAC") were banned,1 63 and the unrest was rap-
idly suppressed.
On July 21, 1985, State President P.W. Botha proclaimed a
second state of emergency over certain areas of the country, this
time in response to the continuing unrest arising from the deep-
ening recession and protests against the 1983 Constitution. This
state of emergency was lifted on March 7, 1986, only to be re-
placed by a nationwide state of emergency proclaimed on June
12, 1986, imposed in anticipation of nationwide protests to com-
memorate the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprising.1 64 This
state of emergency was renewed onJune 11, 1987, and remained
in effect until June 1990, except in Natal where it remained in
force until October 1990. In addition, a series of emergency-
type restrictions were imposed by the Minister of Law and Order
by declaring trouble spots "unrest areas." 16
It has been noted that "the extra powers which the govern-
160. MATHEWS, supra note 121, at 227.
161. Id. at 227-28.
162. See R. v. Maphumulo, 1960 (3) S.A. 793 (N.P.D.); Stanton v. Minster ofJus-
tice, 1960 (3) S.A. 353 (T.P.D.).
163. Proclamation 119, GG No. 6414, Apr. 8, 1960. This proclamation was re-
newed annually until 1963 when, by amendment to the Unlawful Organisations Act, the
need for annual renewal was removed. MATHEWS, supra note 43, at 69.
164. HuMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 30, at 44. The Soweto upris-
ing began on June 16, 1976, following the killing of numerous students engaged in a
peaceful rally against the use of Afrikaans teachers in black schools. Id.
165. Public Safety Amendment Act 67 of 1986, supra note 23. "Unrest areas" were
recently declared in Natal following incidents of ANC-Inkatha violence and in town-
ships across the country following the assassination of Chris Hani, the popular leader of
the CPSA and member of the ANC's executive committee. The former government was
not shy about declaring unrest areas. In February 1993, the city of Johannesburg was
declared an "unrest area" following protests by black taxi drivers over harassment by
traffic officials. David Beresford, Pretoria Suggests Bill of Rights But With Qualifications,
GUARDIAN, Feb. 3, 1993, at 10.
Many of these recent impositions of localized states of emergency were enforced
with the approval and support of the ANC, acting under the auspices of the National
Peace Committee (the "NPC"), one of the many multi-party committees to emerge
from the 1990 Peace Accord. Telephone interview with Pieter Rousseau, Vice-Consul
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ment has been able to give itself under the state of emergency
have added enormously to its ability to a mount an all-out assault
on those who oppose its policies. Most importantly, it has been
able to use those powers to bypass both Parliament and the
courts."166 In early 1986, the government appeared reluctant to
maintain its nationwide state of emergency and introduced the
Public Safety Amendment Act 67 of 1986 in order to secure the
same emergency powers with fewer parliamentary controls. 167
This act provided "'no hassle' emergency power."168 It allowed
the Minister of Law and Order to declare areas as 'unrest areas'
and to apply the appropriate regulations to control the situa-
tion.169 Unless withdrawn by the Minister, the declaration of an
unrest area was effective for three months, although it could be
renewed. In order to limit court jurisdiction, the Public Safety
Amendment Act denied jurisdiction over declarations of emer-
gencies, states of unrest, or the regulations pursuant thereto.1
70
On June 12, 1986, Botha renewed the nationwide state of
emergency, which remained in effect for four years.' 71 Under
these regulations, even the most junior soldiers and police of-
ficers were empowered to arrest and detain, without charge, in-
dividuals for up to fourteen days.' 7 2 The Minister of Law and
Order was authorized to extend detentions indefinitely.
Furthermore, the regulations prohibited the making, pos-
session, or dissemination of "subversive statements." Not surpris-
ingly, this term was broadly defined in order to cover virtually
any criticism of the status quo. Any object or publication
for Political Affairs, South African Consulate, New York [hereinafter Rousseau Inter-
view].
166. HuMAN RIGHTS AND THE RuLE OF LAW, supra note 30, at 88.
167. Id. at 89.
168. MATHEWS, supra note 121, at 214.
169. Public Safety Act 3 of 1953 § 5A. This act was introduced by the Public Safety
Amendment Act 67 of 1986.
170. The Eastern Cape court, however, asserted that this 'ouster clause' did not
prevent it from determining the legality of regulations enacted in terms of the Public
Safety Act. MATHEWS, supra note 121, at 214 (citing United Democratic Front v. State
President, unreported decision of the Eastern Cape District).
171. The Amendment Act was opposed by the coloured and Indian houses of Par-
liament, which forced Botha to circumvent Parliament by passing the law via the Presi-
dent's Council. This action further undermined the credibility of the tricameral Parlia-
ment. Nevertheless, the ensuing delay is credited with forcing Botha to reimpose the
nationwide emergency. HuMAN RIGHTS AND THE RuLE OF LAW, supra note 30, at 89.
172. Public Safety Act 3 of 1953 § 5A(8).
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deemed by the State President to threaten the interests of the
state was prohibited. The definition of "subversive statement,"
under the regulations issued June 12, 1986, was described as en-
compassing
many statements which advocated or encouraged actions
which were entirely lawful. For example, it included any
statement likely to have the effect of inciting any member of
the public to take part in any protest procession (regardless,
apparently, of the object of the protest), or which could incite
a person to oppose the government or any Minister or official
in connections with any measure relating to the maintenance
of public order or in connection with the administration of
justice.
The December 11 th regulations expanded the definition
of "subversive statement" even more widely, to cover a state-
ment inciting the public to take part in any boycott or unrest
or civil disobedience or to take part in any illegal strike or to
take part in any informal administrative or judicial structure
or procedures.
173
Publication of information regarding police activities was
also prohibited, and members of the security forces were im-
mune from civil or criminal liability arising out of their work, so
long as they did not act in bad faith. These national powers were
further supplemented by local regulations effected under dele-
gated authority. Such regulations included, inter alia,
detailed restrictions on funerals; banning possession of T-
shirts and emblems of forty-seven named organisations in the
Eastern Cape; imposing curfews; prohibiting pupils from be-
ing outside their classrooms in school hours; prohibiting the
dissemination of statements made by 119 named organisa-
tions in the Western Cape; prohibition of gatherings by
named organisations in Witwatersrand; [and] prohibition of
loitering anywhere in Kwandebele. 174
In November of 1985, the use of audio-video equipment for
recording disturbances or situations of unrest, in designated
emergency areas, was prohibited except under official permis-
sion, and then only under police supervision. 175 This regulation
prompted Reverend Alan Boesak to decry that "the purpose of
173. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RuLE OF LAW, supra note 30, at 91.
174. Id. at 90.
175. Frederikse, supra note 130, at 644.
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keeping reporters out of the townships is so that our children
can be murdered in circumstances where there will be no wit-
nesses and no record."1'7 6 Meanwhile, academics at the Univer-
sity of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg argued that the restric-
tions merely presaged a new township police and army strategy
that would be highly unacceptable to foreign television view-
ers.
177
Although the 1986 restrictions were successfully challenged
on the grounds of uncertainty,'7 8 the government largely rein-
stated the prior proscriptions in the emergency regulations
promulgated on December 11, 1986.179 A similar process oc-
curred in 1987 following a court decision to set aside certain
prohibitions regarding the reporting of security actions and the
deployment of security forces.'18  Ultimately, the emergency law
restrictions barred the reporting of "virtually any form of activity
by the security forces-or indeed any matter connected with any
form of public protest. The reporting of any reference to alter-
native structures was likewise prohibited. Even the presence of
journalists at scenes of unrest, restricted gatherings or security
action was banned-and likewise the taking of pictures at such
events."' 8'
II. INDIRECT REGULATION OF SPEECH
In addition to the extensive measures designed to discour-
age and hamper political speech critical of apartheid and the
South African status quo, a number of laws and regulations fur-
ther undermined citizens' freedom of expression. The former
government's ability to ban or detain organizations and individu-
als clearly deprived those parties of a political voice. Moreover,
the government had extensive powers to intimidate and harass
parties in an effort to limit the volume of their opposition. In-
deed, the South African government repeatedly recognized the
benefits of self-censorship and other forms of censorship which
were less than patently visible. A Director of the Publications
176. Id. at 644.
177. Id. at 647 (citation omitted).
178. Metal and Allied Workers Union v. State President, 1986 (4) S.A. 385 (D).
179. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RuLE OF LAW, supra note 30, at 92.
180. United Democratic Front & Release Mandela Campaign v. State President,
1987 (3) S.A. 296 (N).
181. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RuLE OF LAW, supra note 30, at 92.
1994]
926 FORDHAMINTERNJATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 17:896
Appeal Board even went so far as to comment that "self-control
is, of course, the ideal form of control."18 2
A. Detention and Banning
The government's power to detain or ban individuals de-
rived primarily from the Internal Security Act of 1982.183 This
act provided for "six forms of detention that [were] classifiable
into the categories of preventive detention and pre-trial deten-
tion."1 84 Preventive detention included: potentially indefinite
preventive detention that could be imposed by the Minister of
Law and Order; 85 short-term preventive detention that could be
ordered by a police officer for forty-eight hours and extended by
magisterial warrant to a maximum of fourteen days;18 6 and a
180-day detention provision enacted in 1986.187
The power of the Minister of Law and Order to impose in-
definite preventive detention was "part of permanent law and
[could] be used even in times of peace without any need for the
declaration of an emergency."' 88 Detention could be ordered
on any of three grounds, if the Minister: (a) had "reason to be-
lieve" that the person in question would commit terrorism, sub-
version, or sabotage; 8 9 (b) was "satisfied" that the party would
endanger the security of the state or the maintenance of law and
order; or (c) had "reason to suspect" that a person who had
committed a specified offense't 0 was likely to endanger state se-
curity or the maintenance of law and order.' 9 '
The Minister's detention power was doubly broad. The
crimes of subversion and sabotage and the notion of a threat to
state security or law and order were wide-ranging and inclu-
182. VAN ROOVEN, supra note 57, at 4.
183. Internal Security Act 74 of 1982; see discussion supra section I(b). In addition,
detentions may be ordered under section 185 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
and section 13 of the Abuse of Dependence-Producing Substances and Rehabilitation
Centres Act 41 of 1971.
184. MATHEWS, supra note 121, at 62.
185. Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 § 28.
186. Id. § 50.
187. Id. § 50A. This section was introduced by section one of the Internal Security
Amendment Act 66 of 1986.
188. MATHEWS, supra note 121, at 63.
189. Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 § 54(1)-(3).
190. Id.
191. Id. § 28(1).
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sive.' 9 2 Furthermore, the statute applied the subjective discre-
tion clauses where the Minister "[was] satisfied" and "[had] rea-
son to believe." All of these phrases were subjected to deferen-
tial judicial review.1 93 In general, the courts would review only
whether the specified governmental authority in fact entertained
the suspicion or apprehension or held the necessary opinion.1 9 4
The courts would not examine the grounds for the suspicion,
opinion, or apprehension. 195
Short-term preventive detention was based on similarly
broad discretionary grounds. Arrest and detention were author-
ized if a police officer was "of the opinion" that: (a) the actions
of the party in question were contributing to the continuation of
a state of public disturbance, disorder, riot, or public violence
and that detention would help combat such a situation, or (b)
that the detention of the party would assist in the prevention or
resumption of such a state of affairs. 196 The relevant officer's
determination was not reviewable on objective grounds by the
magistrate or by a court.'97
Under the third form of preventive detention, a police of-
ficer, who was of the opinion that the arrest and detention of any
person would help to combat, prevent, or terminate various
forms of unrest (including public disturbances, disorder, riots,
or public violence) at any place in the Republic, could arrest
such person without warrant and cause that person to be de-
tained in prison for a period not exceeding forty-eight hours.'18
A commissioned officer of the rank of lieutenant-colonel or
above could order the further detention of the party for a period
not exceeding 180 days if he was "of the opinion" that such ac-
tion would be in the best interests of the state. As one might
expect, an official "opinion" was determinative, and the courts
192. MATHEWS, supra note 121, at 38-44.
193. Id. at 63.
194. Id. at 64.
195. See, e.g., London Estates (Pty.) Ltd. v. Nair, 1957 (3) S.A. 591, 592 (D) ("Rea-
son to believe is, in my opinion, constituted by facts giving rise to such belief"); see also
Watson v. Commissioner of Customs and Excise, 1960 (3) S.A. 212, 217-18, (N); Hurley
v. Minister of Law and Order, 1985 (4) S.A. 709, 716-17 (D); Minister of Law and Order
v. Hurley, 1986 (3) S.A. 568, 570 (A).
196. Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 § 50(1).
197. Groenewald v. Minister van Justisie, 1973 (3) S.A. 877 (A).
198. Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 § 50A(1).
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would not inquire into the conduct of the detainee. 199
The second category of detention was pre-trial detention.
This category included: (1) the indefinite detention, without
warrant, of any party the state had reason to believe: (a) com-
mitted (or intended to commit, or have aided and abetted some-
one who has committed or intended to commit) the offense of
terrorism or subversion, or (b) was withholding information re-
lating to the commission or intended commission of such act;
(2) the detention of witnesses; 200 and (3) the selective, discre-
tionary prohibition of bail for parties charged with, inter alia, se-
dition, terrorism, subversion, the promotion of illegal activities,
or activities on behalf of an unlawful organization.20'
The net result of these three types of preventive, pre-trial
detentions was that the police could indiscriminately imprison,
without charge, anyone resident in South Africa. The impact on
speech in South Africa was commensurately extensive. Critics of
the establishment could be lawfully detained virtually indefi-
nitely, thereby eliminating any opportunity for these persons to
voice or disseminate their political opinion. Furthermore, as
one would expect, detention was a frequent weapon in the
state's war against non-conforming, particularly black, political
activity.
The power to ban organizations was conferred on the Minis-
ter of Law and Order by the Internal Security Act and was sup-
plemented by the Unlawful Organisations Act.20 2 In language
similar to that governing detentions, the Minister of Law and
Order could ban an organization that he determined was en-
gaged in activities which threatened state security or the mainte-
nance of law and order, propagated or otherwise promoted the
spread of communism, or carried on the activities of an unlawful
organization.0 3 Once more, the discretionary clause was held to
preclude judicial investigation into whether objective grounds
existed for an official to rely upon.20 4
199. Minister of Law and Order v. Hurley, 1986 (3) S.A. 568, 570-71 (A); Stanton
v. Minister of Justice, 1960 (3) S.A. 353, 355 (T).
200. Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 § 36.
201. Id. § 30; see id. sched. 3 (enumerated activities).
202. Unlawful Organisations Act 34 of 1960, repealed by Internal Security Act 74 of
1982.
203. Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 § 4(1).
204. South Africa Defence and Aid Fund v. Minister ofJustice, 1967 (1) S.A. 31, 35
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Section 1 of the Unlawful Organisations Act 2°5 enabled the
State President to declare, by proclamation in the Government Ga-
zette,20 6 any body, organization, group, or association of persons,
institution, society, or movement, an unlawful organization. °7
As opposed to the Suppression of Communism Act, there was no
requirement that these unlawful organizations be communist in
any manner. The Unlawful Organisations Act was promptly used
to ban the PAC20 8 and ANC following the Sharpeville Massa-
cre.
209
Section 2 of the Act incorporated many of the restrictions
and prohibitions of the Internal Security Act, as discussed above.
It prevented the recording, reproduction, publication, or dis-
semination of any speech, utterance, writing, or statement made
or produced at any time by any person to whom the banning
provisions were applied. A related statute, the Affected Or-
ganisations Act 210 prohibited the receipt of funds from non-
South African sources by any organization declared, again by
proclamation in the Government Gazette, 'affected.' 211 One com-
mentator suggested that "newspapers should maintain lists of or-
ganisations declared affected so that they... guard against un-
wittingly associating themselves with appeals for funds through
the medium of advertisements, letters to the editor, news re-
ports, stories and articles."21 2
205. Unlawful Organisations Act 34 of 1960.
206. The Government Gazette is an official publication of the government of the
Republic of South Africa. Executive orders, proclamations, regulations, and notices are
deemed effective (subject, under certain circumstances, to Parliamentary or judicial
review) following publication in the Government Gazette.
207. Unlawful Organizations Act 34 of 1960 § 1.
208. The Pan Africanist Congress was founded in 1959 by former members of the
ANC Youth League, who were convinced. that the other racial Congresses (i.e., the
South African Indian Congress, the South African Coloured People's Congress, and the
South African Congress of Democrats) had acquired excessive influence over the ANC.
Like the ANC, the PAC survived in exile and maintained an underground presence in
South Africa.
The ban on the PAC was lifted in 1989. It remains a more radical, albeit much
smaller, organization than the ANC and advocates a vehemently black, (in contrast to
the ANC's multi-racial) nationalist ideology. The PAC is often identified with one of its
more notorious slogans, "one settler, one bullet." Whose Standards?, in ECONOMisT, THE
FINAL LAP: A SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRIa 25 (1993).
209. See supra note 148 (discussing Sharpeville Massacre).
210. Affected Organisations Act 31 of 1974.
211. Id. §§ 1-2.
212. STUART, supra note 67, at 178.
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A number of important opposition groups were declared, at
one time or another, "affected" organizations. These included:
the Christian Institute, labeled affected on May 30, 1975, before
being banned in 1977; the National Union of South African Stu-
dents, declared affected on September 13, 1984, and; the United
Democratic Front, which was declared affected on October 9,
1986.213 After an organization was deemed affected, any foreign
funds in its possession were confiscated. These funds could not
be disposed of except by donation to a charitable or other or-
ganization designated by the Minister of Law and Order.21 4
The impact of banning an organization was not limited to
the legal entity banned, but also encompassed a range of restric-
tions on the officers and members of the proscribed organiza-
tion. A person on the consolidated list of members and officers
was barred from elective office,21 5 certain professions,21 6 partici-
pation in organizations comparable to the banned organiza-
tion,21 7 as well as numerous other activities. 218 "[T]he guiding
principle of government action in the sphere of internal security
[was] 'if it moves, ban it.' "219 Furthermore, "in the eighties the
banning of individuals [became] less common and [was] virtually
replaced by the rule 'if it moves, detain it.' ",220 Once again, the
result was broad discretionary state power to preclude the polit-
ical activity of individuals opposed to the South African regime.
More often than not, the banned organizations were black,
although during the last two years the activities of right-wing,
white organizations were increasingly subject to legal restraints.
B. Government Harassment
The myriad of legal instruments for the suppression of polit-
ical speech were supplemented by a range of extra-legal and
quasi-legal activities. The former government resorted repeat-
edly to erratic enforcement, the threat of criminal and civil liti-
213. HuMAN RiGHTs AND THE RuLE OF LAW, supra note 30, at 55.
214. Affected Organisations Act § 4.
215. Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 § 33(2).
216. Id. § 34(1).
217. MATHEWS, supra note 43, at 65-67.
218. Id. at 112-15.
219. Id. at 101 (citation omitted).
220. Id. (citation omitted).
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gation,2 21 and covert activities to curb political speech deemed
adverse to the interests of the state.222 Throughout the late
1980s, the government issued warnings to the alternative
press, 23 as well as labor, social, and political organizations,
which threatened these groups with criminal prosecution under
the Internal Security Act, the Publications Act, and other statutes
that constrained the expression and dissemination of informa-
tion and opinion.
C. Self-Censorship
Finally, the labyrinthine legal restrictions on political
speech, compounded by the extra-legal activities of government
supporters, had a dramatic impact on individuals' willingness to
engage in political speech. The Publications Appeal Board
strongly encouraged the exercise of self-control. Similarly, the
activities of the Media Council hampered the dissemination of
opinions and information potentially harmful to the govern-
ment. One editor, commenting on the adverse impact of
"creeping self-censorship" stated that "[i]f you're covering the
townships, for example, and you know you're not going to pub-
lish the story anyway, you say: 'Well, why risk my staff?' That
means that your sources of information dry up and you cease to
know what's going on. "224
Economic pressures only intensified the tendency toward
self-censorship. Black publications,2 5 in particular, oftentimes
221. Proponents of these methods, described them as "harassment by due pro-
cess." "It is common for prosecutions to be launched for which there is little of no
evidence; whether or not a conviction is achieved, the accused may suffer deprivation of
liberty and other serious damage over a long period of time." HuMAN RIGHTS AND THE
RuLE OF LAW, supra note 30, at 81. The women's group, Black Sash, documented a
campaign of legal harassment against Cape Town youth in 1986. Id. at 82.
222. Shaun Johnson, an editor of the Weekly Mail, noted that the sanctions di-
rected against the Weekly Mail and its staff, under the Publications Act, were supple-
mented by official intimidation, the disappearance of issues, and the fire-bombing of its
printer. Interview with Shaun Johnson, Editor, WEEKLY MML (July 1988).
223. In late 1987, the New Nation, South, Sowetan, Weekly Mail, and Work in Progress,
all received formal warnings from the government under the state of emergency regula-
tions. There was Little Joy Over the Festive Season, UK PREss GAZETTE, Jan. 4, 1988, at 3.
224. Observer Editor Donald Trelford Was Among Those Criticised for Attending the Centen-
nial Conference of the Star in Johannesburg, UK Putass GAZETTE, Nov. 9, 1987, at 11.
225. The majority of white, South African newspapers and magazines are held by
large corporate entities, such as Argus Printing and Publishing Company (owner of the
Star and Sowetan, the largest South African daily and the largest black daily respec-
tively); Times Media Ltd. (Sunday Times); Nasionale Pers (Huisgenoot); and Perskor
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had limited resources and were severely constrained by the
bonding requirements of the Newspaper and Imprint Registra-
tion Act.22 6
III. TOWARDS THE FUTURE
Following the release of Nelson Mandela on February 11,
1990, the South African government engaged in extensive nego-
tiations with the ANC and other political organizations regard-
ing the structure and timing of a democratic, post-apartheid
state. Although the negotiations ultimately resulted in the adop-
tion of the Interim Constitution, the April elections, and the in-
auguration of South Africa's first multi-racial government, dis-
cussions were suspended repeatedly on account of violence 22
and the intransigence of one or more of the participating par-
ties.228  Despite the on-again,, off-again nature of talks, tremen-
dous progress was achieved, radically transforming South Afri-
can society. During the time leading up to the elections, the NP
government significantly relaxed its control over the govern-
ment broadcasting agency, the South African Broadcasting Cor-
poration ("SABC") ,229 as part of what the government described
as one of a series of steps to create a "fair and free climate" in
South Africa prior to the multi-racial elections. 230  Led by Ivy
(Rapport and Citizen). Argus Printing and Publishing Company, a subsidiary of Anglo
American, is currently scheduled to sell 31% of its operations to Independent Newspa-
pers Ltd., a large international publishing conglomerate headed by Tony O'Reilly, the
Irish chairman of the Heinz Corporation.
226. See supra section I(e).
227. For example, discussions were called off in 1992 following acute violence
throughout the country, including, most notably, the massacre of blacks in Boipatong
in June 1992. See David Beresford, Mandela Calls a Halt to Talks, GUARDIAN, June 22,
1992, at 1. The assassination of Chris Hani, the secretary general of the CPSA, the
leader of Umkhonto we Sizwe, and a member of the ANC executive, also disrupted talks,
although the subsequent national unrest added a note of urgency to discussions. Simi-
larly, the mass detention of PAC leaders on May 25, 1993, led to a temporary suspension
of talks. See Bill Keller, Police, Detain Black Radicals, Imperiling South Africa Talks, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 1993, at Al.
228. David Beresford, SA Constitutional Talks Near Collapse Over Minority Veto,
GUARIAN, May 16, 1992, at 1.
229. In 1987, the senior news controller of the SABC informed his staff that the
Bureau of Information was in control of the news programs and broadcasts. Newspapers
Protest at Reporting Restrictions, in ECONOMIST PUBLICATIONS, LTD., SOUTH AFIuCA COUN-
TRY REPORT (1987).
230. Rousseau Interview, supra note 165.
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Matsepe-Casseburi, a participant in the black resistance,2 3 1 the
SABC, under a new governing board, broadcast numerous inter-
views with black political leaders and adopted a distinctly racially
inclusive attitude towards South African affairs. At the same
time, the government granted temporary radio licenses to, and
refused to enforce bans against unlicensed transmissions by
right-wing, white organizations, including the notorious Radio
Pretoria.3 2
In addition to the reform of the SABC, the government re-
duced its active control of the press, and-in a significant devel-
opment since the nationwide state of emergency in the 1980's-
no visa applications from foreign correspondents have been re-
fused in the last two and one half years. 3 5 Moreover, despite the
many obstacles to consensual reform it appears clear that a
number of legislative acts, including in particular the Internal
Security Act,234 will be subject to prompt revision by the new,
multi-racial government.23 5 As noted, however, the status of the
Publications Act is less clear.23 6
On September 14, 1991, an early watershed event and a har-
binger of the following three years occurred when a National
Peace Accord was signed by the government, the ANC, and
other South African political organizations.23 7 The Peace Ac-
231. Leonard Sussman, Press Freedom is Set Back Worldwide, EDITOR & PUBLISHER 28
(1994).
232. See, e.g., Rex Merrifield, Right-Wing South African Radio Pumps Up Volume,
REUTERS, Jan. 25, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
233. Rousseau Interview, supra note 165. The government had repeatedly exer-
cised its control over work visas as a mechanism for censoring, at least indirectly, the
reports of foreign journalists. Id.
234. The Internal Security Act is already subject to amendment by sections 25 and
34 of the Interim Constitution. See Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200
of 1993, §§ 25, 34, GG No. 15,466, Jan. 28, 1994, at 14, 20. These sections greatly re-
duce the state's ability to arrest, detain, and otherwise silence its opposition.
235. Rousseau Interview, supra note 165.
236. Id.
237. The signatories, in order of signing, were: the Ciskei Government, the
United Workers Union of South Africa, Solidarity Party, the Qua Government, the Na-
tional People's Party, the National Forum, the People's Party, the Lebowa Government,
the Labor Party, the KwaNdebele Government, the KanGwane Government, the
Gazankulu Government, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions, the Democratic
Party, the Congress of Traditional Leaders (Contralesa), the Confederation of Metal
and Building Unions, the Amalgamated Union of Building Trader Workers of South
Africa, the CPSA, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the KwaZulu Govern-
ment, Inkatha, the ANC, the South African Government, and the National Party (repre-
sented jointly by de Klerk). SOUTH AFRICAN CONSULATE GENERAL, NATIONAL PEACE Ac-
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cord established a series of general principles designed to guide
and facilitate discussions of constitutional reform. As such, it
laid the ground work for the Convention for a Democratic South
Africa ("CODESA") ,218 which was adopted by a multi-party plat-
form. More importantly, a significant number of multi-party dis-
cussions were conducted at the World Trade Centre in Kempton
Park. The principles established by the Peace Accord included:
"freedom of conscience and belief," "freedom of speech and ex-
pression," "freedom of association," the right to "peaceful assem-
bly," "freedom of movement," and the right to "free participa-
tion in peaceful political activity." 239 However, these principles
were not embraced without the traditional, apartheid gloss.
Chapter Two of the Accord set forth a code of conduct for
political parties and organizations. Signatory parties were pro-
hibited from attempting "to force anyone to join a political or-
ganisation or resign from any post or office, boycott any occa-
sion or commercial activity, or withhold his or her labor or fail to
perform a lawful obligation." 240 Further, political parties were
barred from "inciting violence and hatred," and required to "in-
form appropriate authorities about the place, date, and routing
of public meetings, rallies and marches."241' The Peace Accord
attempted to ensure a degree of calm throughout South Africa
during the negotiating process. This goal, however, proved im-
possible to achieve as violence and unrest continued to embroil
South Africa and marred the already strained relations between
the ANC and Inkatha. More than 11,000 people have been
killed in the "black-on-black" (as it is generally described in
South Africa) violence as black political groups and their respec-
tive military wings struggle for regional, township, or neighbor-
hood hegemony. 42
CORD, SOUTH AFRICAN BRIEFING PAPER No. 18 (1991) [hereinafter NATIONAL PEACE AC-
coRD]. The PAC did not participate in this process.
238. The official constitutional negotiations have not yet been named, although
the CODESA appellation has been proposed.
239. NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD, supra note 237.
240. Id. at 3.
241. Id.
242. The relationship between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party ("IFP")
has been one of particularly protracted violence. With the support of the government,
Gatsha Buthelezi, the leader of the (non-independent) KwaZulu homeland, has
spearheaded black opposition to the ANC. From its KwaZulu powerbase and appeal to
Zulu 'tradition,' the IFP has been able to garner the support of large numbers of Zulus
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The negotiations towards constitutional reform proved slow
and laborious. Group and individual rights, in particular, posed
significant roadblocks to constitutional change, and still remain
a source of great disquiet. President de Klerk insisted upon a
federal form of government, with entrenched group rights,
designed to ensure a continuing voice in government for the
white minority. 4 ' The ANC, in turn, fought for a unitary in-
terim government which would leave the drafting of a future
constitution to the representatives of a democratically elected
legislative body.
Despite the apparently insuperable gulf between the ANC
and the government and the seeming intransigence of many of
the parties to the Kempton Park negotiations, profound pro-
gress was achieved. In early September 1993, the Nationalist
Party and the ANC reached a final agreement on the form of the
Transitional Executive Council (the "TEC"), which was ratified
by the South African Parliament on September 23. In Novem-
ber 1993, ANC and government negotiators agreed to repeal the
Prohibition of Foreign Financing of Political Parties and the Af-
fected Organizations Act. Simultaneously, the Internal Security
Act was amended to limit the government's authority to detain
suspects without trial and eliminate the police's power to arrest
without warrants.244 The Transitional Executive Council was
designed as an interim governing body intended to supervise
South African governance in the months leading up to the elec-
tions. The TEC included one representative from each of the
major political parties and jurisdictions, and was entitled, with
the agreement of seventy-five to eighty percent of the TEC mem-
bership, to override a wide range of Government decisions. The
TEC was authorized to supervise government management of
in Natal. See GERHARD MARt & GEORGINA HAMILTON, AN APPETITE FOR POWER:
BUTHELEZI'S INKATHA AND SOUTH AFRICA 145 (1987).
243. On May 25, 1993 de Klerk was described as having "in effect rejected black
majority rule... insisting that the white-led National Party should play a central role in
a coalition government lasting into the next century." Andrew Cowers & Michael
Holman, De Klerk Resists Rule of Black Majority in S. Africa, FIN. TIMES, May 26, 1993, at 1.
De Klerk further stated that "power-sharing should be entrenched as a permanent prin-
ciple in any constitution adopted after next year's elections. We definitely believe that a
final constitution must include the principle of power-sharing .... A winner-takes-all
model is the worst possible model there can be for South Africa." Id.
244. SOUTH AFRICAN CONSULATE GENERAL, THIS WEEK IN SOUTH AFRICA (Nov. 9,
1993).
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the Police and Defence Forces and to organize a new peacekeep-
ing force, drawn from existing police and the guerilla armies of
anti-apartheid organizations, 45 to ensure stability and security.
The TEC further exercised executive powers over regional and
local government, finance, defense, and the organization of the
nationwide elections. The TEC's overarching mandate was to es-
tablish the conditions for free and fair multi-racial elections and
to ensure a "levelling of the political playing field and free fair
elections."246
On Tuesday, December 7, 1993, the Transitional Executive
Council was officially inaugurated, although the Council was
marked by the absence of the Inkatha Freedom Party and a
number of black and white, right-wing organizations.247 How-
ever, the TEC was not without significant influence. Early ac-
tions by the TEC included delaying financing to the Bophuthat-
swana homeland and challenging Inkatha Freedom Party activi-
ties in the Natal Province. In addition, the TEC similarly played
an important role in the restructuring of the Police and Defence
Force. More importantly, the TEC enhanced the perception
that the elections were legitimate.
The South African political landscape has been profoundly
transformed by the recent elections. Mandela's ANC is by far
the largest party in Parliament.24 Although the ANC does not
have enough votes to unilaterally alter or enact entrenched legis-
lation, it clearly has the upper hand in parliamentary negotia-
tions. Much of the future of South Africa will depend on how
the ANC exercises its newly entrenched power. While it remains
too early to judge how the ANC will react to its new role as the
majority party, analysts have pored over the first acts of the ANC
government.
Many of Mandela's cabinet choices have been the subject of
discreet, but widespread, criticism. While Mandela's reappoint-
ment of Derek Keys as Finance Minister was generally applauded
245. Bill Keller, South Africa's Parliament Votes for a Black Role in Government, N.Y.
TiMES, Sept. 24, 1993, at Al.
246. AFRncAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, ANC SCENARIO FOR TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY.
247. Kenneth B. Noble, Joint South African Council Takes Over, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
1993.
248. The ANC holds 252 seats in the 400 member House of Parliament, 18 of 27
cabinet portfolios, and controls the legislatures in seven of South Africa's nine provin-
cial governments. Liz Sly, ANC's New Challenge: Governing; Once Revolutionary, Party Must
Now Rule S. Africa, Cm. TRIB., May 8, 1994, at 1.
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and his selection of de Klerk as Second Deputy President was
essentially mandated by the Interim Constitution, other appoint-
ments have been questioned. The selection of Alfred Nzo as
Foreign Minister, in particular, has been criticized.249
Mandela's cabinet reflects a number of the fault lines mark-
ing the ANC and indeed the nation as a whole. His appoint-
ments from within the ANC appear to "favor his organization's
old guard and exiled wing over its younger members who led the
mass democratic movement of the 1970's and 1980's. "1250
Mandela's selection of First Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, the
son of Govan Mbeki, a resistance leader of the 1950's and early
1960's, who was imprisoned with Mandela at Robben Island, also
came as a surprise. The position of First Deputy President had
been expected to be given to Cyril Ramaphosa, the ANC's chief
negotiator at the Kempton Park discussions. After failing to ob-
tain the second position in the ANC administration, Ramaphosa
withdrew his name from consideration for another cabinet posi-
tion. Although he indicated publicly that he was happy to serve
under Mbeki, Ramaphosa's exclusion from the cabinet has been
widely interpreted as emphasizing Mandela's "inability to pull
the ANC leadership together at the moment of transition."251
The conduct of the elections similarly provokes concern re-
garding the future of South Africa. Evidence indicates extensive
electoral fraud. Members of the Independent Electoral Com-
mission cited numerous stuffed ballot boxes, under age voting,
ballot boxes "coming from polling stations that didn't officially
exist," computer sabotage, and other irregularities affecting vot-
ing.252 There were reports of electoral fraud from KwaZulu-Na-
tal, where, in one of the biggest upsets of the eleiction, the In-
249. Nzo has been described as having "a reputation as a tired party hack." David
Beresford & Chris McGreal, South Africa: Mandela Cabinet Choices Stir Quiet Grumbling,
OttAWA CITIZEN, May 9, 1994, at A7. Nzo, age 69, "had virtually disappeared after Mr.
Ramaphosa replaced him as ANC secretary general in 1991, and it had been assumed
that he had retired. His political resurrection was unexpected and could only be ex-
plained in terms of a sentimental attachment on the part of the president-elect. One of
Mr. Nzo's new fellow ministers described him ... as 'singularly lacking in vim.'" John
Carlin, ANC Wins Seven Out of Nine Provinces to Complete Landslide, INDEP., May 7, 1994, at
12.
250. Paul Taylor, Vote Certified as Fair; Mandela Names Team; ANC Will Hold Decisive
Power but Cannot Dictate Constitution, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 7, 1994, at 1.
251. Beresford & McGreal, supra note 249, at A7.
252. Bob Drogin, Ballot Fraud Casts Shadow on S. Africa Vote, L.A. TIMES, May 6,
1994, at Al; see Patti Waldmeir & Michael Holman, South African Elections: Spirit of Con-
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katha Freedom Party received 50.8% of the votes counted.15
Overruling the local election monitors, Judge Johann Kriegler,
the chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission stated
that the election process was "admittedly flawed," although he
sought to downplay the'irregularities by stating that "the heart of
the matter.., was that we were able to establish the will of the
people. 254
The ANC's national leadership endorsed the Independent
Electoral Commission's determination that the KwaZulu-Natal
elections had been fundamentally representative, apparently
overruling the provincial leadership. 255 The decision of the
ANC, not to dispute the election results of the KwaZulu-Natal,
encouraged the prospects of peaceful relations with Buthelezi
and advanced an institutional role for the Inkatha Freedom
Party. 2 56
While it is unclear whether the ANC's attempts to promote
a peaceful and consensual transition will be successful, 7 the
overall election results have been hailed as serendipitous:
[T] he country's three major centers are shared between three
parties: the Johannesburg/Pretoria regions to the ANC,
KwaZulu/Natal to Inkatha, and the Western Cape to the NP.
The ANC also failed to get a two-thirds majority, which would
have enabled it to call the shots in the constitution-writing
process. 'This will help promote power-sharing and consen-
sus decisionmaking and should boost the concept of a gov-
ernment of national unity,' says a Western diplomat. 'You
could say it's a dream result because it will reassure whites
and the business community and has defused the ethnic con-
flicts, which often threatened to wreck the transition.' 25 8
Regardless of how the vote was achieved, the results have been
ciliation Sweeps Aside Letter of Vote - the Election was Deeply Flawed, but Nearly Everyone Likes
the Outcome, FIN. TIMES, May 7, 1994, at 3.
253. Id. The ANC received 31.6% of the votes in the province, despite pre-election
polls giving it a majority of the vote. In fact, the IFP only agreed to participate in the
election one week prior to the voting.
254. Taylor, supra note 252, at 1.
255. Bob Drogin, First Blacks Take Oaths as S. African Legislators; Government: New
Lawmakers Also Elect Provincial Premiers. Mandela Attends Services of Various Faiths, L.A.
TIMES, May 8, 1994, at Al.
256. Id.
257. John Battersby, Mandela Shapes New Leadership, CHISTAN ScI. MONITOR, May
9, 1994, at 2.
258. Id. (citations omitted).
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accepted on a national level. The ANC, the NP, and Inkatha,
the principal parties in the new Parliament, are now faced with
the responsibility of forging a new political regime.
As South Africa enters the second phase of its constitutional
negotiations, the drafting of a new constitution pursuant to the
terms and framework of the Interim Constitution,259 the voices
and demands of the heading political forces in contemporary
South Africa, will once again rise to the forefront. In the end,
the ability of the ANC, the NP, Inkatha, and the other, smaller
political parties, will be determinative.
A. Freedom of Speech and the African National Congress
The 1955 Freedom Charter,260 an aspirational document
adopted at the Congress of the People in June 1955,261 asserts
that "[a]ll shall enjoy human rights! The law shall guarantee to
all their right to speak, to organise, to meet together, to publish,
to preach, to worship and to ediucate their children."26 2 Simi-
259. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, GG No. 15,466,
Jan. 28, 1994, at 1.
260. 1955 Freedom Charter, June 26, 1955, reprinted in M. HAMALENGWA ET AL.,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RcTrrs IN AFRICA: BAsic DOCUMENTS AND ANNO-
TATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 99 (1988).
261. The Freedom Charter was adopted at the Congress of the People, a two-day
conference held in Kliptown, a coloured township nearJohannesburg. Three thousand
delegates from across the country attended; including, 320 Indians, 230 coloureds, and
112 whites. The Congress was organized primarily by the ANC, SAIC, SACOD, and the
South African Coloured People's Organization (later the Coloured People's Congress).
Organizations in attendance also included the Liberal Party (an English-speaking white
Parliamentary party), six trade unions, the Federation of South African Women, the
Cape Peace Council and a number of local vigilance organizations. LODGE, supra note
35, at 69-70. The Congress came to an end when the proceedings were stormed by
armed policemen who seized the podium, confiscated all the documents they could
find, announced that they had reason to believe that treason was being contemplated,
recorded the names and addresses of all the delegates, and then sent everyone home.
Id. at 71.
The Freedom Charter, consisting of a list of basic rights and freedoms, begins by
affirming the multiracial character of South African society: "South Africa belongs to
all who live in it, black and white." 1955 Freedom Charter, supra note 260. In addition,
the Charter promised equal status for "all national groups;" limited nationalization (of
mines, banks, and monopoly industries); equal opportunities to all who wished to trade
and manufacture; land redistribution; free compulsory education; an end to restrictions
on labor and labor organizations; and a range of welfare provisions concerning working
conditions, unemployment, health, housing, the aged, and the disabled. Id.
262. 1955 Freedom Charter, supra note 260. It should be noted, however, that the
Freedom Charter simultaneously mandated the protection of all national groups
"against insults to their race and national pride." Id. While the implications of this
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larly, Article 4 of the ANC's 1990 draft Bill of Rights, "Freedom
of Speech, Assembly and Information" declares that "[t]here
shall be freedom of thought, speech, expression and opinion,
including a free press which shall respect the right to reply."263
These affirmations of an entrenched freedom of expression,
prompted by the mechanisms of political repression, provide
only a general suggestion of rights in post-apartheid South Af-
rica.
The Freedom Charter and the ANC's 1990 draft Bill of
Rights strongly suggest that the ANC is committed to a constitu-
tionally entrenched doctrine of free speech, comparable, in
broad terms, to the freedoms that currently exist in the United
States. Moreover, the ANC's 1993 publication, Ready to Gov-
e ,64 emphasizes the role of an entrenched Bill of Rights
enumerating "certain basic rights and freedoms as universally
understood which no future government will normally be able to
take away except by special majority."2 65 The ANC document
further asserts that "the Bill of Rights will guarantee that South
Africa is a multi-party democracy in which people enjoy freedom
of association, speech and assembly and the right to change
their government. Furthermore, the public have a right to know
what is being done in their name - we believe in a strong right
to information and a firm guarantee regarding the free circula-
tion of ideas and opinions. "266
In section N, "Media," Ready to Govern sets forth the ANC's
policy guidelines regarding the regulation of print and broad-
cast media. Once again, the ANC asserts, "[t]he basic principle
around which our Media Charter should revolve is maximum
openness within the context of a democratic constitution and
Bill of Rights. '267 This goal, however, is qualified to the extent
that "[t] he citizens' right to privacy, dignity and any other free-
doms entrenched in the Bill of Rights shall not be violated in
prohibition are unclear, it does suggest the possibility of restrictions akin to section
47(2) (d) of the Publications Act. See supra 'note 70 and accompanying text.
263. ANC CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR A NEW SOUTH AF-
RICA: A WORKING DOCUMENT (1990).
264. AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, POLICY UNIT, READY TO GovERN: ANC POLICY
GUIDELINES FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AIucA 6 (1993) [hereinafter READY TO GOVERN].
265. Id. at 6.
266. Id. at 6-7.
267. Id. at 60.
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favour of the free flow of information."2"
In order to achieve some sort of balance between perceived
social goals and the unfettered flow of information, the ANC
provides:
All people shall have the right of access to information
held or collected by the state or other social institutions sub-
ject to any limitations provided for in a constitution and Bill
of Rights.
There shall be no institutional or legislative measures re-
stricting the free flow of information or imposing censorship
over the media and other information agencies.
All people shall have the right freely to publish, broad-
cast and otherwise disseminate information and opinion, and
shall have the right of free access to information and opinion-
All media should subscribe to a Standard of Practice
and/or Code of Conduct agreed upon among the producers
and distributors of public information, communications and
advertising.
There shall be no restrictions on private broadcasting in-
itiatives beyond the accepted constitutional constraints and
technical regulations arising out of legislation governing me-
dia.269
Despite ANC affirmations of the ideal of free speech, the
ANC's post-election commitment and ability to implement such
an ideal is far from clear. The ANC is in many ways a diverse
coalition beholden to many conflicting ideals and interest
groups, as Mandela's difficulties in selecting his cabinet amply
demonstrated. In the fractious, divided South African polity, the
ANC attempts to cover the spectrum of opposition groups. First,
it is multi-racial. Second, it attempts to attract the support of all
tribal groups, as well as progressive English and Afrikaner whites.
Third, it relies on the support and cooperation of the Commu-
nist Party of South Africa (the "CPSA"). Finally, it reaches out to
corporate South Africa.27 °
268. Id.
269. Id. at 61.
270. The late secretary general of the CPSA, Chris Hani (also a member of the
ANC executive) embodied the contradictions inherent in the ANC's economic plat-
form. Although a self-avowed communist, he favored multi-party elections and an econ-
omy under a "variety of ownerships." The Flawed Inheritance, in ECONOMIST, THE FINAL
LAP: A SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICA 20 (1993). His colleague, Joe Slovo, confirmed this
position by stating, "[w]e have all accepted the need for a mixed economy, and that
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The ANC's ability to generate and maintain political con-
sensus is already strained to the limits, and the responsibility of
governing will only strain this ability further. The ANC's pre-
election platform embraced the contradictory goals of lowering
black expectations of an immediate increase in employment,
wealth and opportunity, while simultaneously promising com-
prehensive land reform, economic growth, improved social serv-
ices, and general improvement in the welfare and opportunities
of the hitherto oppressed black population. David Beresford
comments that:
[T]he ANC's approach, appropriate for a liberation
movement but questionable for a political party, verges on
the utopian. 'Peace, Freedom and a better life for all,' its
campaign literature offers through, for example, public works
programmes, a near miraculous "solution" to the massive
housing shortage and a commitment to stamp out illiteracy
within five years.
Several ANC promises smack of fantasy. A guaranteed
minimum of 10 years of "compulsory, free and equal educa-
tion" may be justifiably ambitious, but transferring 30 per
cent of agricultural land to blacks within five years is hardly
viable without confiscation.
271
Only time will tell whether the ANC (either independently or
with the support of other political groups) will be able to gener-
ate a society capable of respecting individual rights, even with an
entrenched constitution and bill of rights.2 72
Early indications of the ANC's commitment to free political
speech remain mixed. Black journalists, especially, have come
foreign investment is not charity." Id. at 23. Nevertheless, populist pressure for large
scale nationalization and the redistribution of wealth will be pronounced: "that such a
tidal wave is gathering is beyond reasonable doubt." Id.
271. David Beresford, The Wily Old Brawler Takes on the Nervous Newcomer, GUARIMAN,
Jan. 26, 1994, at 12.
272. There are acute economic (and political) pressures facing post-apartheid
South Africa:
A post-apartheid government will certainly cut real spending on whites;
the present government is doing so already. But the racial arithmetic (5m
whites, 29m blacks, with the black population growing at more than 2.5% a
year) means that these cuts will produce sadly little extra for blacks. They will
stay poor until South Africa finds a way to expand its economy. Sooner or
later they will vent their disappointment on the government in office, no mat-
ter what colour it is.
Between Two Worlds, in ECONOMIST, THE FINAL LAP: A SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRIcA 4 (1993).
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under attack in the townships for either not reporting events
(when publication is legally barred) or for depicting events in a
'biased' or 'unfavorable' light. Nomavenda Mathiane, an assis-
tant editor of Frontline, an independent monthly founded in
1979, has written on "censorship from the liberation move-
ments. "273 He notes that "there was a time when the press had
one enemy and that was the law. Falling foul of this meant de-
tention or whatever the system deemed fit. Today we would
rather face a hostile government than cross paths with the move-
ments."274 Liberation movement sanctions against journalists,
he comments, range from "ostracisation or the gutting of the
journalist's house to necklacing."2 75
Mathiane's comments indicate the pervasive difficulties fac-
ing the post-election, ANC-dominated government. The strug-
gle against apartheid has been an all-encompassing battle for
blacks in South Africa. To many, defeating the opposition takes
priority over notions of individual rights. "It is seen as right to
expose the atrocities of the system," Mathiane cautions, "and
condone those done in the name of the struggle. Black journal-
ists are doing good work if they expose Afrikaner farmers who
exploit black workers, but become bad guys when they write
about black traders in Soweto working fellow blacks as slaves in
their shops."2 76
Until a social consensus recognizing the importance and
priority of civil rights takes hold, it is unlikely that rights, such as
free speech, will be secure. Recent studies indicate that such a
consensus remains in the distant future. Those "who have been
most thoroughly denied the luxury of free expression, are most
likely to view it with suspicion. For example, one recent poll
found that a majority of blacks do not believe white parties have
a right to conduct election campaigns in black townships."277 As
the campaign so powerfully illustrated, 7 8 ongoing ethnic and
273. South Africa: Black Journalists Experiencing Grave Problems, GUARDIAN, May 7,
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1994] 943
944 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 17:896
tribal conflict (such as that between Inkatha and the ANC) will
continue to impede the path to free speech in South Africa.
B. Freedom of Speech and the National Party
The de Klerk administration's road to constitutional reform
was a complicated and contentious one, as de Klerk sought to
consolidate white, coloured, and Indian support through an
often reactionary, rear-guard "law and order" policy while simul-
taneously claiming for himself the cloak of reform and libera-
tion. 79 Throughout the period leading up to the adoption of
the Interim Constitution, de Klerk called for the rapid transfer
of power to a democratically-elected multi-racial government
while persistently seeking to preserve the role and status of
whites in South Africa. In February of 1993, the former govern-
ment attempted to take the initiative in the constitutional discus-
sions by publishing the Government's Proposals on a Charter of
Fundamental Rights (the "Draft Charter" or "Charter").280
The introduction to the Charter conceded the status of Par-
liamentary sovereignty in South Africa:
In the past rights have been infringed and unless the system is
adjusted fundamentally, there can be no guarantees against
future infringements. For this reason the Government is to-
tally committed to a new constitutional dispensation in which
the powers of the various branches of state authority, includ-
ing those of Parliament, will be limited by and subject to cer-
tain basic, universally accepted legal norms. A Charter of
Fundamental Rights must and shall be one of the most im-
portant elements of the new system. A Charter is essential to
protect the rights of the citizen against the arbitrary and dis-
criminatory use of Parliamentary and political power. In the
new system the Law must reign supreme.
2 8 1
On its face, this statement represented a significant concession
by the state regarding the future South African society. None-
theless, it remained a self-serving one. The white-elected govern-
279. The NP's racially driven campaign was largely successful. Although approxi-
mately 85% of the black population, and few whites, voted for the ANC, the majority of
the white, Indian, and coloured population voted for the NP. Waldmeir & Holman,
supra note 252, at 3.
280. REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS ON A CHARTER OF FUN-
DAMENTAL RIGHTS (1993) [hereinafter DRAFT CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS).
281. Id. at 1.
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ment struggled against the accession to significant, substantive
reform.
Indeed, these proposals bore a striking resemblance to the
former South African legal system, and appeared to offer at best
only incremental progress. The draft charter was based on four
principles. The first was the principle of "verticality," which
meant that "the charter primarily regulate[d] legal relations be-
tween the State and the subject."28 2 Furthermore, the Charter
stated that it did not "directly regulate legal relations among sub-
jects themselves," although the charter would have "an 'over-
flow' effect on such horizontal legal relations." 2 3 This principle
greatly reduced the application of the Charter, due to its re-
moval of private action from the scope of constitutionally limited
activity.
Section Two of the Charter asserted that "no provision of
this Charter shall be construed so as to create or regulate legal
relations other than those between the State and a person. 284
The commentary elaborated that it was not "intended as a direct
source of rights or obligations among individuals themselves, for
example, to enable a dissatisfied employee to sue his employer
on the ground of alleged infringement of his fundamental
rights."285 Ultimately, this principle of verticality bore a striking
(and surely not coincidental) resemblance to the U.S. Supreme
Court's application of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted in the Slaughter-
House286 and Civil Rights Cases.287
The second guiding principle identified by the government
was the principle of "negative enforcement."28 8 The drafters
noted that "this has the effect that the Charter will apply to the
State in a prohibitive rather than mandatory sense. That is to
say, the state is primarily prohibited from infringing fundamen-
tal rights. In certain specified cases the state is, however, re-
quired to fulfill particular needs."2 89 Once again, the resem-
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. § 2(1), at 4.
285. Id. § 2, at 5. This qualification would appear to materially undercut and cir-
cumscribe section 6, "Equality before the law." See id. § 6, at 6.
286. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
287. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
288. See DRAf-r CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RiGHTs, supra note 280, at 1.
289. Id.
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blance to racially-biased American jurisprudence was striking.
The notion of "negative enforcement" recalls aspects of the
American "state action" doctrine with its often permissive atti-
tudes towards discrimination by private, i.e., non-governmental
actors. Accordingly, negative enforcement seemed to indicate a
willingness or intention on the part of the government to toler-
ate or otherwise ignore racially biased conduct in the (white-
dominated) private economy.
The third principle encompassed the ability of a post-
apartheid state to "curtail or limit rights." This principle sought
to preserve the South African state's overriding interest in, and
ability to enforce, "state security," and "law and order." The cur-
tailment or limitation of rights would have ensured that "the
State is authorized to curtail rights within reasonable limits."290
Ominously, the government warned that "chaos will follow if the
rights of persons should prevail absolutely. In order to regulate
society in the general interest, the State must have the power to
delimit such rights in accordance with specific democratic values
and norms."29' Section 1 of the Charter reiterated the state's
power to limit or suspend fundamental rights under the com-
mon law, through a competent legislature, and to the extent
provided for by sections 35 and 36 of the Charter. 92 Finally, the
Charter was predicated on the principle of 'justiciability. 293
The least offensive of the government's four principles, jus-
ticiability was described as ensuring the protection and enforce-
ment of fundamental rights through a "strong and independent
judiciary."294
With regard to specific provisions concerning speech and
political activity, the Charter declared that "every person shall
have the right to freedom of speech and other forms of expres-
sion, and the right to obtain and disseminate information."295
Subsection 2, however, noted that subsection 1 "shall not pre-
clude the registration and licensing of newspapers and other
forms of communication."296 The commentary further observed
290. Id.
291. Id. at 2.
292. Id. § I(a)-(b), at 4; see id. §§ 35-36, at 21-22.
293. Id. at 2.
294. Id.
295. Id. § 9(1), at 8.
296. Id. § 9(2), at 8.
POLITICAL SPEECH IN SOUTH AFRICA
that "as in the case of most other rights this right may sometimes
have to be limited."297 The affirmation in section 10 of the "free-
dom of meeting" contained a similar qualification, which stated
that "it is only recognised in so far as it is exercised peacefully
and unarmed. Violent meetings and demonstrations are not
protected by the Charter."2 9 8
These explicit provisions governing speech appeared to re-
affirm the National Party's commitment to the principal instru-
ments of media regulation: the Publications Act and the News-
paper and Imprint Registration Act. Moreover, as proposed, the
Draft Charter would have authorized the full panoply of restric-
tive measures then in force. Section 35 authorized the limitation
of fundamental rights, "to the extent in which such limitation is
reasonably necessary-
(a) by virtue of state security, the safety of the public, the
public order and interest, good morals, public health,
the administration of justice or public information;
(b) to uphold the rights and freedoms of others;
(c) to prevent or combat disorder, violence, intimidation or
cime."299
Echoing the Internal Security Act on which it appears to have
been based, Section 35 afforded vast discretion to the govern-
ment's vision of a future, democratic state. The commentary to
section 35 noted that "the purpose of Section 35 is to prescribe
standards against which it can be determined if a particular limi-
tation of a fundamental right is permissible. The legislature is
strictly bound inasmuch as any limitation must be REASONABLY
NECESSARY on the ground of one or more of the considerations
mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d) ."300 As noted throughout
this article, subjective discretionary clauses have had a pro-
nounced history of deferential application in the Republic of
South Africa.
Section 36 of the Charter provided for the "suspension of
fundamental rights" during states of emergency. A state of
emergency existed under the Draft Charter when "the contin-
ued existence of the State or the safety of the public in the Re-
297. Id.
298. Id. § 10, at 8.
299. Id. § 35(1)(a)-(c), at 21.
300. Id. § 35 (commentary), at 21.
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public or in a part of the Republic [was] threatened by an actual
or threaten [ed] war or invasion, an insurrection or general riot-
ousness,"301 and "the suspension of that fundamental right [was]
reasonably necessary to ensure the continued existence of the
State or the safety of the public."30
2
The Charter further provided for the continuing power of
state detention, although this authority would be subject tojudi-
cial review. Section 23, "Personal Freedom," states that a person
"may be deprived of his or her freedom" in any of a series of
enumerated circumstances, if in accordance with the detention
procedures prescribed by a law of a competent legislature.3 °3
The enumerated circumstances authorize a wide range of pre-
trial detentions of suspects and witnesses, including the "deten-
tion of a person for investigation and trial on the ground of a
reasonable suspicion that he or she has committed an of-
fence. '304 Although the Charter purported to limit the applica-
tion of detention provisions, 5 the Charter, nonetheless, would
have afforded a wide range of discretionary detention. Upon
court approval, detentions would have been both legal and free
from the ten day limitation imposed by section 37. Moreover,
section 37(d) also allowed for detention in excess of ten days
following an indeterminate authorization or leave.
The government's Charter, therefore, did not represent a
great deviation from the status quo, and was not incompatible
with the existing legal structure, prompting doubts about the de
Klerk government's commitment to substantive reform, as well
as its sincerity in the continuing multi-party negotiations. De
Klerk's willingness to engage in fundamental change was ques-
tioned in one commentary, which stated that "[f]or the past
three years at a high cost in lives and much else, Mr. de Klerk has
fought a stubborn rearguard action designed to ensure that
whites would have a strong residual influence over the incoming
black-dominated government. And since the ANC was clearly
301. Id. § 36(a), at 22.
302. Id. § 36(b), at 22.
303. Id. § 23(2), at 14.
304. Id. § 23(2)(a)-(n), at 14-15.
305. Section 37(d) prohibits "the detention of any person in circumstances other
than those authorized in the specific instances set out in section 23 for a period longer
than 10 days without leave or an order of a court of law." Id. § 37(d), at 22. Sections 23
and 37 continue to apply during states of emergency. See id. §§ 23, 37, at 15, 22.
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going to be the strongest black party in that government, the
main aim of the rearguard action was to weaken it."" °6
C. The Interim Constitution
On December 22, 1993, apartheid's last Parliament voted to
approve the Interim Constitution.30 7 The Interim Constitution,
which came into effect automatically following the South African
elections held in April, 1994, serves two roles. It provides for a
nationwide system of governance ranging from a series of en-
trenched individual rights to the allocation of taxing and police
powers. The Interim Constitution also establishes the guidelines
of the post-election Constitutional Assembly.
The Interim Constitution provides for a bicameral legisla-
tive body elected for a term of up to five years consisting of a
larger lower house, the National Assembly, and a smaller Sen-
ate. 08 Sitting together, both houses constitute the Constitu-
tional Assembly and must be convened by the President of the
Senate within seven days of the first sitting of the Senate under
the Constitution. 0 9 The Constitutional Assembly is obligated to
draft and adopt a new constitutional text "within two years as
from the date of the first sitting of the National Assembly under
this Constitution. 310 In order for a constitutional text to be
adopted, it must be approved by "at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Constitutional Assembly."3 1 Section 73 of the
Interim Constitution goes on to establish the mechanisms for
adopting the future constitution.
Any constitutional text drafted by the Constitutional Assem-
bly is required to comply with the terms of schedule 4 to the
Interim Constitution. Schedule 4, "Constitutional Principles"
states, inter alia, that:
306. Three-Card Trick, in THE ECONOMIST, THE FINAL LAP: A SURVEY OF SOUTH A-
RICA 11 (1993).
307. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, GG No. 15,466,
Jan. 28, 1994, at 1.
308. The Interim Constitution states that "[t]he Constitution shall provide that, un-
less Parliament is dissolved on account of its passing a vote of no-confidence in the
Cabinet, no national election shall be held before 30 April 1999." Constitution Act 200
of 1993, sched. 4, princ. XXXIII, GG No. 15,466, Jan. 28, 1994, at 216.
309. Constitution Act 200 of 1993, § 68 (1)-(3)(a), GG No. 15,466, Jan. 28, 1994,
at 40.
310. Constitution Act 200 of 1993, § 73(1), GG No. 15,466, Jan. 28, 1994, at 42.
311. Id. § 73(2).
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I
The Constitution of South Africa shall provide for the
establishment of one sovereign state, a common South Afri-
can citizenship and a democratic system of government com-
mitted to achieving equality between men and women and
people of all races.
II
Everyone shall enjoy all universally accepted fundamen-
tal rights, freedoms and civil liberties, which shall be provided
for and protected by entrenched and justiciable provisions in
the Constitution, which shall be drafted after having given
due consideration to inter alia the fundamental rights con-
tained in Chapter 3 of this Constitution.
III
The Constitution shall prohibit racial, gender and all
other forms of discrimination and shall promote racial and
gender equality and national unity.
IV
The Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land. It
shall be binding on all organs of state at all levels of govern-
ment.
V
The legal system shall ensure the equality of all before
the law and an equitable legal process. Equality before the
law includes laws, programmes or activities that have as their
object the amelioration of the conditions of the disadvan-
taged, including those disadvantaged on the grounds of race,
colour or gender.
VI
There shall be a separation of powers between the legis-
lature, executive and judiciary, with appropriate checks and
balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and open-
ness.
VII
The judiciary shall be appropriately qualified, independ-
ent and impartial and shall have the power and jurisdiction to
safeguard and enforce the Constitution and all fundamental
rights.
VIII
There shall be representative government embracing
multi-party democracy, regular elections, universal adult suf-
frage, a common voters' roll, and, in general, proportional
representation.
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Provisions shall be made for freedom of information so
that there can be open and accountable administration at all
levels of government.
These principles, ultimately, remain rather vague. The
phrase "universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and
civil liberties" verges on the tautological, particularly within a so-
ciety like South Africa's where national societal norms have been
notoriously difficult to achieve. The ostensibly consensus-pro-
moting requirements, that the future Constitution comply with
the Constitutional Principles and be approved by no less than
two-thirds of the Constitutional Assembly, are reassuring only in
light of the final election results.3 12
Although the Constitutional Principles provide little de-
tailed evidence with regard to individual civil rights and the free-
dom of speech, the Interim Constitution itself, in Chapter 3, (en-
titled "Fundamental Rights") does provide a clearer indication
of the direction of the World Trade Center negotiators (a group
which, given the proportional representation electoral system
and the mandated National Unity coalition"'3 cabinet structure,
broadly resembles the Mandela Cabinet, at least with regard to
ANC and NP representatives). Several sections of Chapter 3 af-
fect freedom of speech: section 15, "Freedom of Expression,"3 14
312. The ANC failed to obtain the two-thirds majority required to control debate
in the Constitutional Assembly. Perhaps fortuitously, one commentary noted that "the
manifold irregularities experienced in polling and counting truly canceled each other
out; perhaps more overt manipulation was applied to the result .... [T] here is such a
neat parallel between what was supposed to happen, and what did happen, that one can
be forgiven for wondering whether it is not the result of a serious intervention."
Waldmeir & Holman, supra note 252, at 3.
313. Constitution Act 200 of 1993, § 88, GG No. 15,466, Jan. 28, 1994, at 50. The
Interim Constitution mandates that any party that receives five percent or more of the
vote must be represented in the Cabinet, a mechanism which ensures a significant con-
tinued white role in the next government de Klerk has insisted during the Kempton
Park negotiations that "power-sharing... should be entrenched as a permanent princi-
ple in any final constitution adopted after next year's elections. 'We definitely believe
that a final constitution must include the principle of power-sharing,' he said. 'A win-
ner-takes-all model is the worst possible model there can be for South Africa.'" Cowers
& Holman, supra note 244, at 1 (citations omitted). Mandela's cabinet consists of eight-
een representatives of the ANC, six from the NP, and three from Inkatha.
314. FREEDOM OF ExPREssIoN
15. (1) Every person shall have the right to freedom of speech and expres-
sion, which shall include freedom of the press and other media, and the free-
dom of artistic creativity and scientific research.
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provides for the broad protection of free speech. This section is
further supplemented by the right to free assembly, demonstra-
tion and petition;315 freedom of association;316 freedom of move-
ment;31 7 residence;"'8 and extensive political rights." 9 As seen
elsewhere in South African law, however, these rights are tem-
pered bythe coextensive right to "human dignity." Section 10
declares, in terms highly reminiscent of section 47 of the Publi-
cations Act, that "every person shall have the right to respect for
and protection of his or her dignity." The potential conse-
quences of such protective legislation are by now well known in
South Africa. Literature, films, articles, photographs, or even
oral statements may run the risk of offending someone, or some
group's sense of dignity. The door to censorship remains firmly
open.
CONCLUSION
Despite the profound and seemingly irreversible progress of
(2) All media financed by or under the control of the state shall be regulated
in a manner which ensures impartiality and the expression of a diversity of
opinion.
Constitution Act 200 of 1993, § 15, GG No. 15,466, Jan. 28, 1994, at 12.
315. ASSEMBLY, DEMONSTRATION AND PETITION
16. Every person shall have the right to assemble and demonstrate with
others peacefully and unarmed, and to present petitions.
Constitution Act 200 of 1993, § 16, GG No. 15,466, Jan. 28, 1994, at 12.
316. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
17. Every person shall have the right to freedom of association.
Constitution Act 200 of 1993, § 17, GG No. 15,466, Jan. 28, 1994, at 12.
317. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
18. Every person shall have the right to freedom of movement anywhere
within the national territory.
Constitution Act 200 of 1993, § 18, GG No. 15,466, Jan. 28, 1994, at 12.
318. RESIDENCE
19. Every person shall have the right freely to choose his or her place of
residence anywhere in the national territory.
Constitution Act 200 of 1993, § 19, GG No. 15,466, Jan. 28, 1994, at 12.
319. POLITICAL RIGHTS
21. (1) Every citizen shall have the right-
(a) to form, to participate in the activities of and to recruit members
for a political party;
(b) to campaign for a political party or cause; and
(c) freely to make political choices.
(2) Every citizen shall have the right to vote, to do so in secret and to
stand for election to public office.
Constitution Act 200 of 1993, § 21, GG No. 15,466, Jan. 28, 1994, at 12.
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the past five years, South Africa's history of political abuse bodes
ill for the long-term prospects for political reform and the forg-
ing of a democratic consensus. Albie Sachs, a leading ANC
spokesman has noted that the country's history of oppression
greatly complicates constitutional negotiations: "[I] t is a sad trib-
ute to the way law has impinged on the life of the majority of
South Africans that a Bill of Rights is seen essentially as a means
of using juridical techniques to restrict rather than enlarge the
area of human freedom."2 0 Sachs notes that a Bill of Rights is
suspect to many in the black community, in large part, due to
the (not unfounded) fears that such a document will merely
serve to protect the privileges of the white population. 321 For
instance, the Azanian People's Organization ("AZAPO"), a black
consciousness organization affiliated with the PAC, refused to
participate in the Kempton Park negotiations on the grounds
that they were "undemocratic and incapable of delivering a last-
ing political solution for the country and its people."3 22
The history of the regulation of speech in South Africa in
the years under apartheid evinces an over-arching desire to sup-
press opposition to the government's social policies. These ef-
forts have involved the explicit regulation of the content and
context of political expression; security measures which afford
wide latitude to detain or ban individuals, thereby preventing
them from voicing or otherwise expressing their opposition to
the legal regime; and strict limitations on the ability of the media
to report events within the country. Although these measures
are prima facie race neutral, they have been applied in a highly
arbitrary, racie-specific manner. Furthermore, the measures reg-
ulating speech have always had a disproportionate impact on the
black population.
320. Albie Sachs, Towards a Bill of Rights in a Democratic South Africa, 6 S. AiR. J.
HUM. RTs. 1, 3 (1990).
321. Id. at 4-13. For example, Constitutional Principle 12 states that "[c]ollective
rights of self-determination in forming, joining and maintaining organs of civil society,
including linguistic, cultural and religious associations, shall, on the basis of non-dis-
crimination and free-association, be recognized and protected." Constitution Act 200
of 1993, sched. 4, princ. XII, GG No. 15,466,Jan. 28, 1994, at 212. In addition, Princi-
ple 14 provides that "[p]rovision shall be made for participation of minority political
parties in a manner consistent with democracy." Constitution Act 200 of 1993, sched. 4,
princ. XIV, GG No. 15,466, Jan. 28, 1994, at 212. Both Principles are designed to pre-
serve the political independence and influence of white South Africa.
322. AZAPO Against Current Negotiations, SOUTH AFRICAN PREss ASSOCIATION (1993).
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South Africa remains on a perilous path to a society of en-
trenched individual rights. The Interim Constitution has been
designed to promote a consensual, democratic polity and the of-
ficial election results appear to encourage the parliamentary in-
volvement of the country's principal ethnic groups. Mandela,
too, has been careful to espouse conciliatory, reformist lan-
guage. Much, however, will depend on the ability of Mandela
and his Deputy Presidents, Mbeki and de Klerk, to sustain the
new coalition government and Constitutional Assembly. In
South Africa today, there remains no easy talk on the road to
freedom.
